HISTORY OF EUROPE. > 255 <*V 



applied to foreign princes fo~ the 

 use of theirtroops, ic \vi'.s njtfroin 

 want of pble men of our own to 

 fight our batUes ; but ^ood policy 

 which led us to spare our own peo- 

 ple for the cultivation of arts, busi- 

 nesses, and agriculture ai home. — 

 The wurst po'lcv, on the Other 

 hand, pron^pted our enemies to rifin 

 iheir country, by draining it of 

 overy useful hand tiiat could be 

 torn from ilip necessary pumiits of 

 a civliized nation, and sent into the 

 field, where every useful habit was 

 soon forgotten, and no improve-^ 

 menis made but those of destruc- 

 tion By those coercive means, the 

 wliole ma'^s of society was forced 

 into acf'.on ; — but si:ch. ethirts 

 were too violent to be lasting. It 

 was a dreadful but a short-lived 

 exertion of all the strength and 

 power of a nation; which biing 

 unnatural, and condary to the fun- 

 damental principles of civilized so- 

 ciety, must terminate in its di,-so- 

 Jution Si soon as the means of ac- 

 tion produced by its cultivation be- 

 gan to fail. But while this exer- 

 tion continued, our own should be 

 proportioned to It, though not in 

 the same desperate extreme. In 

 order, therefore, to obviate so great 

 an evil, we ought cheerfully to sa- 

 crifice all the wealtl) we could pos- 

 sibly part w ith, tu procure such a 

 proportion of strength, where^ er it 

 could be found, as would enable us 

 to face the enemy until that pe- 

 riod arrived, which must infallibly 

 coiu:? when he would b^ radically 

 exhausted. On this principle, the 

 treaty with Prussi^ was founded. 

 Wj thefeby acfjuired a numerous 

 and well disciplined force at much 

 less cost ti.an we could liavc ob- 

 tained lcvie> of raw men, unlit for 

 Survicc till a long spa.e of train- 



ing iiad elapsed. Had we not ta- 

 Ic^-n this method to secure that, 

 power, it would have been lost to 

 the confeueracy. 



The sentiments expressed by the 

 Marquis of Lansdowne on this oc- 

 casion wf re, that ministry had vm- • 

 r;-asonably narrowed the time for 

 considering the treaty with due at- 

 tention. This treaty had most com- 

 pletely reversed the ord-r of things. 

 Prussia, the lender of the allied 

 powers, coitld hardly now be view- % ^ • 

 ed in any olher light than as a hirer 

 of troops to the coalition. But 

 . these subsidiary treaii?s had long 

 ijeen the channel through which 

 the treasures of this country flo\M|fi 

 imo the coffers of our allies; wtio 

 seemed to claim a presumptive 

 right to load us with all the ex- ^ 



peiices of our connections with '^ 



them. But what amity subsisted be- 

 tween Prussia and Austria to unite 

 thair CO operations against a com- 

 mon enemy ? Their jealousies and 

 suspicions of each other obstructed 

 all cordiality ; and the expence at 

 which we underwent to encourage 

 union between them, tended usu- 

 ally to rendei- them rivals in rapa- 

 city, and eagerne:s which of the 

 two could extort most f.om us, un- 

 der the denomination of subsidies 

 and loans, without reconciling them M 



to ea'.-h other. This mutual inve- .*. 



teracy was the cause of th^ ill suc- 

 cess of the coalition : and would 

 th 3 treaty bring any remedy? — 

 Prussia boasted that 70,000 of its 

 choices troops had l;et;n employed 

 against the French ; but that, with 

 all their b .avery and veteranship, 

 tliey iiad b-cn assailed by such mul- 

 ti'.udes, that valour and ski.l were 

 unable to stc.n so inrrcssant and 

 n.erwhe'minga torrent. Thi'^ tor- 

 rent was daily eujreasitig, and be- 



comi.-.ij 



