90] 
Prince. of Saxe Teschen; which, 
with other events in the field, of 
this year, we are about to relate. 
The intelligence brought from 
time to time to the French princes, 
from every city, strong-hold, and 
military corps in France, was of the 
most encouraging kind. The sen- 
timents of the Duke of Brunswick 
on this and other heads, which had 
been discussed. before the expedi- 
tion broke ground, may be col- 
lected from an observation which 
he is said to have made to the con- 
federate sovereigns and princes re- 
lative to their intelligence: —“ If 
these reports be true, there will not 
be occasion for half the force to be 
assembled: but.if they be false, and 
that a spirit is to be encountered 
in France directly opposite to what 
is described, the combined armies 
will not be sufficient for. the under- 
taking.”’ It is at. the same time to be 
observed, that the Austrian govern- 
ment, weakened by the war against 
the Turks, instead of sending sixty 
thousand men. into the low coun- 
tries, according to the original plan, 
was unable to raise more than thir- 
ty thousand; which were reduced 
to half that number, by a detach- 
ment of fifteen thousand, under 
General Clairfait, to join the Prus- 
sian army before Longwy; which 
detachment was farther reduced 
by the necessary garrisons of Na- 
mur, Mons, and Tournay. These 
facts it seemed proper to intro- 
duce in this place, previously to a 
narrative of the campaign, to which 
they belong ; as they serve to il- 
lustrate, ina very importantdegree, 
both its conduct on the part of the 
German commander-in-chief, and 
its termination. 
The plan of the Duke of Bruns- 
wick, then, on, the whole, appears 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1792. 
to have been as follows: To set out, 
from Coblentz, with an army of 
Prussians, fifty thousand strong, and. 
to march, by Treves and Luxem-. — 
bourg, to Longwy. After the re-. 
duction of this place, and also, if 
possible, Montmedy, to establish at 
both, magazines for the army ; and, 
from thence to continue the march, 
and to reduce Verdun. In support 
of these, as well as of subsequent 
operations, the court of Vienna ene 
gaged to bring into the field two, 
armies: the one to act in the coun-, 
try between the Rhine and the 
Moselle, and to, be of sufficient 
strength for the purpose of me- 
nacing at once Landau and Saar-. 
Louis, and carrying on the siege of. 
Thionville ; while the other, of 
much superior force, should be en- 
gaged in some important operations 
in the low countries; but whose 
positions should be as near to the 
army of the Meuse as possible. If 
the pleasing expectations that had — 
been entertained of a general rising 
in France, and co-operation with: 
the invading army should not be) | 
verified, it was the design of the 
Duke of Brunswick not to cross: 
the Meuse; but, during the siege 
of Thionville, as soon as the Prus~ 
sians should be masters of Verdun, 
to detach a considerable portion of 
his army for taking Sedan, Me- 
zieres, and perhaps, with the aid of, 
the Austrian armies inthe low coun- 
tries, of Givet. In possession of the 
banks of the Meuse from Verdun — 
to Givet, his flanks covered by two 
Austrian armies, it would be in the 
power of the Duke to throw his 
troops into cantonments behind’ 
that river: from whence he would 
be able to observe the opposite: po- 
sitions. of the enemy on the Sam- 
bre ; and from graund so strong to 
