94] 
had served in their revolution, 
chiefly procured from France. 
Matters were thus situated, when 
it was determined in the French 
councils to march a body of troops 
into the Austrian frontiers, and to 
take possession of the important 
pass of Porentrui, already taken no- 
tice of, and the territory of the 
Bishop of Basil, in which it is situ- 
ated. 
We cannot sufficiently condemn 
the very extraordinary measures 
adopted on this occasion by the go- 
yvernment of France. 
It has already been observed, 
that neither of the armies were in a 
state to take the field; for besides 
their want of discipline, they were 
in want of every requisite to consti- 
tute an army. It was originally in- 
tended by the French cabinet, that 
the campaign should not commence 
before the 14th of May; but such 
was the rash anxiety of the royal 
party, that on the 22d of April or- 
ders were transmitted to begin ope- 
rations from the army of the north 
and the centre army; and the ar- 
my of the Rhine on the 29th of 
that month. 
The commanders and principal 
officers were aristocrats, menstrong- 
ly inclined to the person of the 
King, and strenuous supporters of 
monarchical, power. M. Biron, 
who held a subordinate command 
under Rochambeau, was appointed 
from Paris, by orders immediately 
from the King, to conduct an ex- 
pedition, the object of which was, 
to appear before the garrison of 
Mons, a considerable frontier town 
of Austrian Netherlands, distant 
from Valenciennes, twenty-one 
miles. 
The avowed intention of this 
movement was, to discover the dis- 
position not only of the troops, but 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1792. 
of the inhabitants of the Low Coun- 
tries: but the whole appears to 
have been extremely ill concerted ; 
and if we were to venture a con- 
jecture on this subject, it would be 
unfavourable to the cause of royal. 
ty, and that it was done more with 
a view to throw matters into great- 
er confusion, and to open the way 
for the entrance of the Austrian — 
troops into France, and to hasten — 
their approach, as the situation of — 
affairs in the capital was becoming 
every day more and more uncer-_ 
tain and precarious. What ap- 
pears extremely suspicious is, that 
M. Rechambeau was not at all 
consulted, and had no discretionary 
orders or power. Had he been 
apprized of the intentions of the 
French ministry, he would with- 
out doubt have given it his decid- 
ed negative. What could exceed 
the madness of the scheme of send- 
ing against regular -disciplined 
troops, the worst disciplined in 
Europe, ‘and those too unprovid- 
ed with tents, stores, or ammu- 
nition? no hospitals for the sick 
and wounded,—nothing but dis- 
order throughout every depart- 
ment! If we consider that the 
commanders were for the most 
part disaffected, we may account 
for this apparent confusion and 
contradiction. 
In order to favour this diversion, 
for it never can be considered in 
the light of a real and serious at- 
tack, orders were transmitted to 
Lieutenant General d’ Aumont, to 
detach M. Theobald Dillon, with 
ten squadrons of cavalry, and some 
battalions of infantry, ene 
in all to three thousand, towar 
Tournay. M. Carle was in like 
manner to march from Dunkirk 
with 1200 men, to make a feint on 
Furnes. 
The 
