100] 
army under Rochambeauw occupied 
the direct road to Brussels, without 
any impediment but the garrison of 
Mons; and besides, the roads and 
country were extremely favourable 
to the march ofan army. The force 
under La Fayette, which bad been 
ordered to assemble and form in 
the neighbourheod of Mentz, had 
been ordered to rendezvous at Gi- 
vet; a commanding and projecting 
situation towards the county of Na- 
mur, on the river Neuse. The 
strong fortress of Namur is also on 
this river, and commands on that 
Side, not only the county itself, but 
the city of Brussels and all Bra- 
bant; from whence the reduction 
of the maritime Netherlands was 
an easy and an immediate step. 
Fayette had every advantage to ex- 
pect from the navigation of the 
Meuse; by which means also his 
stores and provisions, with the ar- 
ticles necessary for a siege, would 
have been conveyed with ease and 
alacrity. Another object of the 
first importance, was the capture of 
Liege and Maistricht, both strong 
holds on the same river; and whose 
seizure would have been justified 
on the score of political necessity ; 
which in all cases where princes or 
‘kingdoms are concerned, super- 
cedes all other considerations. The 
armies of France possessed of these 
places, would be able to oppose a 
strong barrier against the house of 
Austria; and prevent their forces 
from penetrating into and relieving 
the low countries. The numerous 
detachments of French troops ex- 
tending from Dunkirk to Givet, 
would have easily accomplished 
the reduction of Tournay, Furnes, 
Ipres, and all the subordinate garri- 
sons ; whilst the great body of the 
army would. have concentrated 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1792. 
themselves at Brussels and Lou- 
vain, and speedily have entirely 
subjugated this valuable appendage 
of the house of Austria. It is here 
to be remarked, that the arms of 
France were by no means seconded 
by the Belgians, in the way it had 
been supposed: and in place of 
many of the inhabitants being ready 
to join their standard, scarcely any 
appeared besides the emigrants who 
had accompanied the army. 
Every thing was now in the great- 
est state of disorder: the original 
plan of the campaign was totally 
overset; and in place of the Aus- 
trian Netherlands being over-run 
by French troops, the frontier of 
France was entirely open to the in- 
roads of the Hulans and other irre- 
gular troops, who committed every 
depredation in collecting forage, 
plundering the peaceabie inhabit- 
tants, and even in levying contri- 
bution in the towns and villages. - 
According to the plan concerted — 
between the generals at the meet- 
ing at Valenciennes, it was resolved _ 
that the army of M. de la Fayette — 
should give up all intentions against — 
Namur, and by degrees draw to- — 
wards Maubeuge: there to forma ~ 
permanent entrenched encamp-_ 
ment, This measure was suggested — 
with a view to favour the operations ~ 
of Luckner, who, during the ap-— 
proach of Fayette’s army, was ®usi- — 
ly employed in equipping and bring- — 
ing into order the troops under his — 
command, for an attack on West. 
Flanders; where it was imagined — 
there was a great probability of 
success. o 
When Fayette was about to p 
this plan in practice (23d of May, 
M. Gouvion was surprised at Ham- — 
phede, near Florennes. ‘This little 
affair terminated on the side of the 
Austrians: — 
