a 
HISTORY OF EUROPE, 
requiring time and deliberation, it 
was not till the month of May that 
their answer was delivered; nor till 
the 18th that the question came ul- 
timately before the House. Their 
decision however did not prove sa- 
tisfactory to the friends of the bill, 
whothought they had not expressed 
themselves with perspicuity ; and 
treated their decision with severity. 
The rights of juries alone to de- 
cide on the question of libels, was 
vigorously maintained by Lord 
Camden. He laid open in the 
clearest manner the necessity of 
uniting the matter of Jaw with the 
matter of fact, in the trial for pub- 
lishing a libel. They were no less 
united than action and intent were 
the consideration of all other crimi- 
nal proceedings. As without im- 
plied malice a man could not be 
found guilty of murder, so an evil 
intention constituted the guilt of a 
libel; and if the jury was denied 
the right of judging of its intention 
and tendency, the right of judging 
of the fact of publication might as 
well be denied; for both were so 
connected that there wasnojudging 
of the one without passing judgment 
at the same time onthe other. He 
recapitulated a series of cases from 
time of the celebrated Judge 
Bracton, who lived five hundred 
| years ago ; in proof that, in all the 
charges to juries, they were to 
judge of the intention and tenden- 
ey of the alleged libel. Judge 
Jeffries himself. notwithstanding his 
devotion to an arbitrary court, had 
been of this opinion. To whom 
should the judging of libels be con- 
ided? or, to speak with more pro- 
priety, who were to guard the liber- 
ty of the press? The judges or the 
people of England? The jury were 
evidently that people. The judges, 
a : 
[iz 
it might be said, were independent: 
but were they beyond the reach of 
influence? They certainly were 
not. Juries, on the otherhand, were 
much less liable to corruption. 
Were the press once delivered up 
to the discretion of the judges, soon 
must its freedom be utterly de- 
stroyed, and that strongest bulwark 
of English liberty be overthrown. 
These arguments were ably se- 
conded by several other Lords. It 
was remarked by Lord Lansdown, 
that the act. by which thejudges had. 
been declared independent of the 
crown, was a mere illusion: they 
were, it was true, independent of 
the people; but they had much to 
depend on from the crown and mi- 
nistry. A chief justice, for instance, 
might be the leader of a party as 
wellasany other Lord in that house, 
and no less actuated by hdpes, and. 
expectations than any other cour- 
tier. What impartiality could, in 
the nature of things, be relied on 
from a person heated with rage at 
the party in opposition to him, and 
presiding on a trial fora libel write 
ten in contradiction to his senti- 
ments, and levelled at himself in 
common with his partizans ? 
Twelve reasonable and conscien-. 
tious men were, he firmly believed,, 
as competent to pronounce judg 
ment on a matter of law and fact 
as the judges themselves. But the 
profession of the law filled men with 
presumption and arrogance: they 
thought themselves,entitled to uni- 
versal deference from all other clas- 
ses; and ambitiously sought to do- 
mineer over society. Could that 
ennobled member of the law who 
presided at the King’s bench, overs, 
throw the bill.in question, he would, 
added Lord Lansdown, become 
Lord Paramount of England. 
The 
