APPENDIX TO THE CHRONICLE. 
upon the trial of an indictment or 
information for a libel. We con- 
sider this doctrine as so firmly set- 
tled, and so essentially necessary 
to the maintenance of the King’s 
peace, and the good order of so- 
ciety, that it cannot now be drawn 
into debate.—If it be asked, why 
the word false is to be found in 
indictments or informations for 
libel? we answer, That we find it 
in the ancient forms of our legal 
proceedings, and therefore that it 
Js retained ; but that it hath in all 
times been the duty of judges, 
when they come to the proof, to 
separate the substance of the crime 
from the formality with which it is 
attended, and too frequently load- 
ed, and to confine the proof to the 
substance. The epithet false is 
not applied to the propositions 
contained in the paper, but to the 
aggregate criminal result—libel. 
We say, falsus libellus, as we say 
Jalsus proditur in high treason. In 
point of substance, the alteration 
in the description of the offence 
would hardly be felt, if the epithet 
were verus instead of falsus. In 
the action for libel, the plaintiff is 
not put to prove the matter of the 
libel false, which is decisive to 
shew that the falsehood is not part 
of the substance of the complaint ; 
and though the defendant may 
insist in his defence, and may 
prove that the matter of the libel 
is true, itis not done in the way 
of contradicting what is asserted 
by the plaintiff, for then it might 
be done under the general issue; 
whereas, if the defendant means 
to insist that the matter of the 
libel is true, he must plead it by 
way of justification. As between 
him and the plaintiff, seeking to 
recover damages for the private 
63 
injury, the truth of the matter of 
the libel is a bar to the action for 
damages; the crime, and conse- 
quently the falsus libellus, remain- 
ing still in full force against him. 
The second branch of the ques- 
tion is, ‘* Does it make any dif- 
ference in this respect, 7. e. in 
respect of the materiality of the 
truth or falsehood, cr its being 
to be left to the jury, whether the 
epithet false, be or be not used 
in the indictment or informa- 
tion ?”?—Our answer will be very 
short. It can make no difference 
in this respect. Weare not called 
upon to give any opinion; and we 
desire to be understood not to give 
any opinion as to the difference 
in any other respect which the 
omission of a formal epithet, in an. 
indictment or information, may 
make. 
Your Lordships third question is, 
*¢ Upon the trial of an indictment. 
for a libel, the publication being 
clearly proved, and the innocence 
of the paper being as clearly mani- 
fest, is it competent and legal for 
the judge to direct or recommend 
to the jury to give a verdict for the 
defendant?” We answer, That upon 
the trial of an indictment for a libel, 
the publication being clearly prov- 
ed, and the innocence of the paper 
being as clearly manifest, it is com- 
petent and legal for the judge to 
direct or recommend to the jury 
to give a verdict for the defendant. 
But we add, that no case has oc- 
curred, in which it would have been, 
in sound discretion, fit for a judge, 
sitting at Nist Prius, to have given 
such a direction or recommenda- 
tion to the jury. It is a term 
in the question, that the innocence 
shall be clearly manifest, This 
must be in the opinion of the 
* judge ; 
