THE CHRONICLE. 
heard as a competent witness in 
such trial before the jury ?” 
This question is put so generally, 
that we find it impossible to give a 
direct answer to it. The criminal 
intention charged upon the defend- 
ant in legal proceedings on libel, is 
generally matter of form, requiring 
no proof on the part of the prosecu- 
tor, and admitting of no proof on 
the part of the defendant to rebut 
it. The crime consists in publish- 
ing a libel ; a criminal intention in 
the writer is no part of the defini- 
tion of the crime of libel at the 
common law. ‘* He who scattereth 
firebrands, arrows, and death,’’ 
(which, if not an accurate defini- 
‘tien, is a very intelligible descrip- 
tion of a libel) is e@ ratione criminal; 
it is not incumbent on the prosecu- 
tor to prove his intent ; and on his 
part, he shall not be heard to say 
«© Am I not in sport??? But inas- 
much as a ¢riminal intention may 
conduce to the proof of the publi- 
cation of all libels; and inasmuch 
as the criminal intention is of the 
substance of the crime of libel in 
some cases by statute,—cases may 
be put where a witness is compe- 
tent and admissible to prove the 
criminal intention on the part of 
the prosecutor: and it may be 
stated as a general rule, that in all 
cases where a witness is competent 
and admissible to prove the crimi- 
nal intention, a witness will also be 
competent and admissible to rebut 
the imputation. 
Your Lordship’s fifth question is, 
—“ Whether, upon the trial of an 
indictment for sending: a theaten- 
ing letter, the meaning of the let- 
ter set forth in the indictment be 
matter of law or fact ?” 
We find ourselves embarrassed 
by the terms in which this question 
Vor. XXXIV. 
65 
is proposed tous. We find no diffi- 
culty in answering, that the expo- 
sition of the words of the letter, set 
forth in an indictment for sending 
a threatening letter, would belong 
to the court, either on a demurrer, 
or in an arrest of judgment; and 
we have no difficulty in going a step 
farther, and saying, that if a jury, 
upon the trial of such an indict- 
ment, were to find the letter ac- 
cording to its tenor, it would be for 
the court to expound the letter: 
and whether the letter (the sense 
of it being thus ascertained) be a 
threatening letter within the mean- 
ing of the law, is answered by our 
answer to the first question. This 
we state distinctly to be matter of 
law: it is the judgment of the law 
pronouncing whether the paper be 
criminal or innocent.—But your 
Lordships ask us, ‘‘ Whether the 
sense of the letter be matter of law 
or fact.’ We find a difficulty in 
separating the sense of the letter 
from the letter; the paper without 
the sense is not a letter.— Whether 
there exists such a letter is, doubt- 
less, matter of fact; as much as, 
whether it was sent to the prosecu~ 
tor of the indictment. Itis also mat- 
ter of fact whether an act of parlia- 
ment, public or private, exists: anid 
the same may be said of every other 
writing, from records of the highest 
nature down to any scrap of paper 
wherein words are written which 
can be qualified with crime or civil 
obligation. This goes no way to- 
wards ascertaining what belongs to 
a jury in an indictment for sending 
a threatening letter; to which we 
apprehend your Lordship’s question 
was intended to point.—The exist- 
ence of a public act of parliament, 
your Lordships know, is not sub- 
mitted to a jury at all; private acts 
E and 
