THE CHRONICLE. 
of law, or of fact?” We have said 
in. our answer to the first question, 
that in all cases, and under all cir- 
cumstances, the criminality or in- 
nocence of an act done is matter of 
Jaw, and not of fact. We find no- 
thing in the two cases now put, 
which should lead us to narrow the 
generality of that profession, or 
to except either of those cases out 
of it. But that we may.not be mis- 
understood, we add, that this opi- 
nion does not go to the length of 
taking from the jury the applica- 
tion of the evidence to the overt 
act of which itis evidence. It only 
tends to fix the legal character of 
it in the only. way in which it can 
be fixed. And we take this occa- 
sion also to observe, that we have 
offered no opinion to your Lord- 
ships which will have the effect 
of taking matter of law out of a 
general issue, or out of a gene- 
ral verdict. We know that it is 
often so combined with both, as 
to be inseparable from them ; and 
we disclaim the folly of endeavour- 
ing to prove, that a jury, who can 
find a general verdict, cannot take 
upon themselves to deal with mat- 
ter of law arising in a general issue, 
and to hazard a verdict made up of 
the fact, and of the matter of law, 
according to their conception of the 
law, against all direction by the 
judge.» Our aim has been to trace 
the boundary line between mat- 
ter of law and fact as distinctly 
as we could. We believe that 
this is all that is necessary to 
be known. We have found ju- 
rors in general desirous of keep- 
ing within their province, which 
is to examine into matter of fact, 
and cordially disposed to take 
their directions in matter of law, 
from those whose education and 
habits enable them to declare 
67 
the law, and to whom the law 
and constitution of the country 
have committed that important 
trust. 
Your Lordships last question: is, 
‘< Whether, if a judge, on a trial, 
on an indictment or information 
for a libel, shall give his opinion on 
the law to the jury, and leave that 
opinion, together with the evidence 
of the publication, and the appli+ 
cation of the inuendoes to persons 
and things, to the jury, such di+ 
rection would be according to law??? 
If we do not misunderstand this 
question, it is substantially answered 
in our answer to the third question. 
We mean to answer this question 
in the affirmative; but that we 
may be clearly understood, we de- 
sire to be permitted in our answer 
to substitute the words ‘ declare 
the law,” instead of ‘¢ give his opi- 
nion of law ;’ and the word ‘* de- 
claration’’ instead of ‘ opinion,’” 
where the word “ opinion”? occurs 
again in the question:—Our answer 
will then stand thus: If a judge on 
a trial, on an indictment or infor- 
mation for a libel shall declare the 
law to the jury, and leave that de- 
claration, together with the evi- 
dence of the publication, and the 
application of inuendos to per- 
sons and things, to the jury, such 
direction would be according to 
law.” If by the words, “ leave 
that opinion to the jury,” is meant 
in any manner to refer to the jury 
the consideration of what the law is, 
in any view of the particular case 
in evidence, we are of opinion 
that such a direction would not be 
according to law; conceiving the 
law to be, that the judge is to de- 
clare to the jury what the law is; 
and conceiving that it is the duty 
of the jury, if they will find a ge- 
neral verdict upon the whole mat- 
E2 ter 
