HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
with the highest expectations of 
deriving a multitude of advantages 
from it. No acquisition could ex- 
ceed its value and importance. 
Placed in the middle ground, as it 
were, of the present contention, it 
extended an influence onevery side, 
which, with skilful management, 
might evidently be productive of 
the most beneficial consequences to 
those whom it favoured. Hence 
had formerly arisen the most essen- 
tial part of its power, and that 
weight in the affairs of Europe, 
which had so long been felt and ac- 
knowledged by every state. It 
was now become the property of 
France, and it was hoped, in that 
country, that the effects resulting in 
‘former days, from the strength and 
opulence of the seven provinces, 
would be transferred to the present 
possessors. . Thus reasoned the 
French politicians ;. but they seemed 
to forget that the great power and 
influence of the Dutch republic, 
during the periods of its prosperity, 
was entirely founded on its inde- 
pendence, and on the unanimity 
and patriotism of the Dutch them. 
selves. But this was no longer the 
case; they had long beena divided 
people. It was a disputed point 
among them, who where the real 
patriots; and they were now a 
conquered nation. The wisest heads 
in France did not consider them as 
likely to prove an ative, but rather 
an useful and subordinate ally, from 
whom much aid might be received, 
for the support of the armies and 
finances of the republic. The 
Dutch themselves did not incline to 
move out of the sphere of their do- 
mestic concerns; and, with their 
best wishes for the prosperity of 
France, viewed it chiefly as a secu- 
rity to their own, They were not 
- 
[37 
unwilling to go considerable lengths 
in providing for the various de. 
mands, which they doubted not 
would be made uponthem; but they 
considered their compliance, in this 
respeét, as the price of that freedom 
which they expected to enjoy, in 
the arrargements they were medi. 
tating at home. 
The French, however, seeing 
themselves uncontrouled masters of 
the seventeen provinces, constitut- 
ing that country called the Nether- 
lands, could not refrain from con. 
ceiving the most extensive views of 
conquest in the neighbouring coun. 
tries, After they had driven the 
last remains ot ‘the allied armies 
from their newly acquired terri- 
tories, they next resolved to pursue 
them into the countries where they 
had taken shelter. They first made 
themselves masters of Bentheim, 
which, indeed, was a dependence 
of the Dutch republic, and then ~ 
carried their arms into Westphalia, 
where they defeated a body of im- 
perial forces. The reason why they 
proceeded no farther was the pros. 
pect of a peace with Prussia, and of 
a neutrality for the north of Ger- 
many. Certain it is, that the force 
they had collected in those parts 
showed they had formed great de. 
signs; but the most prudent of those 
who presided over their councils, 
prevailed upon the others to desist 
from attempts that might render the 
French odious, without conducing 
to their interest. What they had 
already acquired was sufficient to 
establish their superiority over the 
combined strength of all their ene- 
mies. The best policy they could 
now adopt would be, to conciliate 
and secure the attachment of their 
new subjects, by punétually adhe- 
ring to the engagements formed 
with 
