58] 
with them, and by proving, through 
the evidence of deeds, that an union 
with France was more eligible than 
2 subjection to their former mas- 
ters. ‘ 
The main obje& of the republi- 
ean councils in France, at this junc- 
ture, seemed to be the renovation 
of their marine, through the means 
afforded by the conquest of Hol- 
land; and the employment of it, 
when renovated, against that power 
which they looked upon as, the soul 
of the coalition against them. They 
“had also two other objects in view; 
the one was, to detach Prussia from 
this coalition, by sowing the seeds 
of jealousy and suspicion between 
the courts of Berlin and Vienna. 
This did not appear to the French 
politicians a matter of much diffi. 
culty. The junction of that power 
with Austria was founded on the 
most extraordinary event that had 
happened in Europe for many cen- 
turies. The French revolution, 
which, by alarming all the crowned 
heads, reconciled at once their jar- 
ring interests, and united them for 
self preservation. But the first pa- 
nic was over; and, notwithstanding 
the antipathy with which the French 
beheld royalty and its adherents, it 
was not imagined that, provided 
they were delivered from the ap- 
prehension of its restoration in their 
éwn country, they would carry their 
hatred of it so far, as to continue 
the war, in order to procure its abo- 
Jition in every other country. A 
strong connexion had subsisted be- 
tween Prussia and France before 
the subversion of ‘this monarchy ; 
the motives for that connexion sub- 
sisted in their full force, and were 
only suspended by an accident, 
which, though unfriendly to the 
system of government settled in the 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1795. 
Prussian dominions, could not alter 
the nature of those relations existing 
necessarily between that court and 
its long-standing rival the court of 
Vienna. _ The politics of this lat. 
ter were incessantly occupied with 
plans for the recovery of that 
valuable portion of its hereditary 
patrmmony, the rich and extensive 
province of Silesia. This was the 
first acquisition that had placed the 
house of Brandenburgh on a footing 
of great consequence. It was re. 
spectable before, but had since be. 
come formidable. ‘This elevation 
of a family, at no time in particular 
esteem at Vienna, created the more 
deep and irradical rancour, that it 
was wholly at the expence of the 
house of Austria, These resent. 
ments would evidently never termi. 
nate, while the causes of them re 
mained; and the house of Branden- 
burgh must either consent to re. 
move them, by restoring the terri. 
tories it had wrested from the impe. 
rial family, in the hour of its dis. 
tress, or keep a continual guard 
against its well-known determina, 
tion to recover them, at any cost, 
on the first favourable opportunity. 
All these considerations were in- 
dustriously laid before the Prussian 
monarch. They were obvious 
truths; but they were enforced 
with so much strength of persuasion, 
that they made the desired. impres- 
sion, and prepared that prince to 
listen favourably to the proposal of 
a separate peace with France, incase 
the powers with whom he had form- 
ed the coalition, should be averse. 
to treat in conjun¢tion with him. 
To this it may be added, that his 
subjects were generally inclined to 
live on terms of amity with the 
French, and had never acceded to 
the junction with Austria, from any, 
othey 
