HISTORY OF EUROPE, 
to detach itself from a confederacy 
wherein it had:been so unfortunate. 
France was no less willing to di- 
minish the coalition, by the se- 
cession of so powerful a member as 
Spain, which, under more skilful 
management, might have proved a 
most dangerous enemy. A treaty of 
peace was accordingly concluded 
‘between them at Basle, on the 
twerity-second of July, by M. 
Barthelemy, on the part of France, 
and Don Domingo d’Yriarte, on 
the part of Spain. The conditions 
were, that France should restore to 
Spain all her conquests in that king- 
dom, and that Spain should cede to 
France all its part of the island of 
Hispaniola, in the West Indies, to- 
gether with all its artillery and 
military stores. Spain agreed to.re- 
-cognise the French, and the Batavian 
or Dutch republic, and France con- 
sented to the interposition of Spain 
in favour of Naples, Sardinia, Par- 
ma, and Portugal. 
There were two articles in this 
‘treaty highly inimical to Gteat Bri: 
tain; the cession’of the Spanish part 
of Hispaniola to France, and the en- 
gagement on the part of Spain, to 
employ ‘every means in its power 
to detach Portugai from its present 
alliance with Great Britain against 
‘the French republic. The loss to 
[63 
the coalition of two such members 
as Prussiaand Spain, added to that 
still greater loss the seven united 
provinces, excited in the enemies 
to the French republic, the greatest 
alarm for the two remaining mem- 
bers, Austria and Great Britian. 
If the former and the latter, when 
united and in full strength, anim. 
paired by losses or defection, ‘had 
failed in their endeavours to bring 
France to submission, it was not 
probable that after the repeated 
defeats of their armies, and the 
dissolution of the confederacy, those 
two powers only should be able to 
effect what all the five together 
could not compass. ‘Thesé reason- 
ings happened certainly well-found- 
ed; but it ought also to be .con- 
sidered, that none of these coalesced 
powers agreed fundamentally in 
their views, and were guided by 
separate interests in whatever they 
proposed. Had they succeeded in 
their first attack of France, it was 
well understood, that their designs 
upon that kingdom were of a na- 
ture to set them quickly at variance 
with each other. Reduced ‘from 
five to two, the agreement between 
these seemed to promise the more 
permanency, that their respective 
arms, by the distance of their ob- 
jects, could noteasily clash together. 
