HISTORY OF EUROPE, 
cempts of the French. Its commu- 
nication with che strong fortress of 
Cassel, on the opposite’ banks of the 
Rhine, secured it a constant supply 
of troops and necessaries: and till 
that was taken, it could hardly be 
reduced by any force. Hence it 
became evident, that unless the 
French were masters of the other 
side of the Rhine, they would vainly 
Jay siege to this city. They had 
now invested it for several months ; 
but the multiplicity of undertakings 
they had projected, interfered so 
much with each other, that they 
had not been able to attend to this 
one witha sufficient degree of care, 
and a great part of the summer 
elapsed, before they commenced 
that plan of operations by which 
alone they could hope to obtain pos- 
session of Mentz. 
The fact was, that the preceding 
campaign had exhausted France 
more than either their enemies or 
friends seemed to have discovered. 
Both were of opinion, that the pre- 
sent year would be an accumulation 
of successes, finish the work of 
French grandeur, and put a period 
to this destructive war, by a treaty, 
of which they would diétate the 
conditions. But their viétories had 
cost them such numbers of their best 
troops, that, although their armies 
were continually supplied with re- 
eruits, it required time to inure 
these to discipline. The profusion 
of their own blood was become so 
inseparably annexed to their taétics, 
that the loss of lives was no longer 
an objeé&t of much consideration in 
the system of French warfare. It 
was by sacrificing their people with- 
out remorse on every occasion, that 
they carried almost every point they 
a : but as those that fell 
jn thedesperate enterprises they were 
{75 
employed in, were the bravest of 
their troops, though they might re. 
place the numbers they were cons 
tinually losing, they could not sup- 
ply their places with an equal pro. 
portion of good soldiers. The 
French officers and commanders 
were fully aware of this deficiency, 
and, for this reason, were become 
less venturous and enterprising, es- 
pecially towards the Netherlands 
and the Rhine, where the bloodiest 
actions had taken place, and their 
successes had been purchased at the 
heaviest cost of men. 
From motives of this nature pro. 
ceeded the seeming inattivity of the 
French in several instances. The 
inconsiderate were inclined to attri- 
bute it to that unsteadiness which is 
thought to mark the French charac. 
ter; and the French were not dis- 
pleased it should be ascribed to any 
but the real cause, which, in the 
present junture, might have opez 
rated to the discouragement of their 
own people, and have, at the same 
time, prompted their enemies to 
exertions that might have proved 
superior to their own. It was not 
till the month of August that the 
French generals determined to open 
effectually the campaign upon the 
Rhine. They began by an attack 
upon Dusseldorf, where a conside~ 
rable body of Austrians was posted, 
The French, however, were in 
such force, and crossed the Rhine so 
unexpe¢tedly, that the Austrians 
were obliged to abandon that city, 
and retire to a large body that lay 
entrenched on the river of Lahn, 
Jourdan, who had effected this pas. 
sage, pressed these Austrian bodies 
so closely, that they fell back with. 
out hazarding any aétion; so great 
at this time, was the terror inspired 
by the French, Encouraged by this 
successy 
