98} 
branch of the legislature operating 
as a counterpoise to the other. The 
principal defe&t, in the opinion of 
most, was the distribution of the 
executive power into five hands, 
instead of consigning it to one only. 
A single chief magistrate appeared 
preferable to five, in several respects. 
The unity of person was certainly 
a complete security against the dis- 
union of sentiments, where it must 
be attended with the most danger. 
Abilities and integrity would also be 
more perceptible and ascertainable 
in one than in several; and, by the 
same reason, the want of them would 
be more clearly discerned in him 
that was defffient. It would, at 
the same time, be less dificult to 
call one individual to account, than 
five, among whom the praise oF 
censure of yood or of evil councils, 
being equally shared, it might not 
be easy to discover who was the 
most or the least deserving of appro- 
bation or of blame. Each would 
be desirous to appropriate to him- 
self as much as he could of the ap- 
plause due to wise measures, and 
no less anxious to shift the odium of 
ill advice apon others. In this con- 
ict it would be vain to expect that 
unanimity could long endure be- 
tween persons env ious of each other, 
from the very nature of the station 
they were jointly placed in. They 
would split into parties, the more 
inimical and violent, from the great 
power with which they were in- 
vested; and, in order to retain it, 
might not scruple to act the most 
hostile part to their rivals, and treat 
them with merciless severity. For 
this reason, numbers of the French 
themselves would have been pleased 
with one supreme magistate, to the 
duration of whose magistracy, two 
years or even. three might have 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1795. 
‘sons of equal capacity 
‘of government, one ought to be fur- 
have consented to accept of such a 
been allotted, instead of five; and 
who, enjoying the good-will of his t 
fellow citizens, might render them 
more services, ifa person of capacity, 
during that space, than could proba- 
bly be done in a longer, by five per- 
to him, but 
obstructing each other through dif- 
ference of sentiments, and even of 
temper, and liable to all those little 
jealousies that’ will often infest the 
intercourse of the best and wisest of 
men. 
Ithas been suggested, on the other 
hand, that ambition was at the bot- 
tom of this newsystem, and prompted 
this division ofalmiost supreme power 
into the hands of five individuals, 
that the framers of this constitution 
might be able to indulge the hope 
of sharing it some future day in their 
turn. That able and ambitious 
men should be governed by such 
motives is not surprising: but to 
fix an imputation of this nature on 
those persons who were entrusted 
with the framing of this new system- 
nished with better proofs than sim- 
ple surmises. The majority of them 
were chosen on account of the 
moderation of their charaf@er and 
principles. Some were noted for 
their preference ofa private to a 
public life, and none were suspected 
of intending to avail themselves of 
this opportunity of rising to powers 
lt is more probable, therefore, that 
they sought to please the nation 
than to gratify their personal ends. 
Had they lodged the chief magistra- 
cy in asingle person, it is not likel 
that the French would at this t1 
magistrate. ‘Lhe majority of th 
who possessed and were able to e3 
ert much influence, were decide 
republicans, not indeed of that vio 
le 
* 
