isf} ANNUAL 
safety ofourown. If, however, the 
sense of the house went to the in. 
dispensable necessity of destroying 
the system now established in France, 
it was their duty to reflect, without 
animosity or prejudice, whether such 
an attempt were praQlicable. The 
only chance we could reasonably 
look to, for the accomplishing so 
arduous a task, was a counter-revo- 
lution, to be effected by the French 
themselves, or such a depression of 
their finances as would absolutely 
deprive them’of the means to resist 
their enemies ; but was either of 
these the case? was it not clear, to 
unbiassed observers, that an irresist- 
ible ‘majority of the Frerch were 
decided republicans, | and sworn 
enemies to a monarchy ? their. fi- 
nances, however unfixed and irre- 
gular, had hitherto answered every 
purpose they had proposed. The 
example afforded, of the uncertainty 
of pecuniary calculations, by the late 
contest with our lost colonies, ought 
to teach us, that national energy 
and spirit are the best and surest 
resources, and that mone ey is far 
from being the principal sinew of 
war. The real debts of France, 
free from exaggeration, did not at 
the present hour exceed, if they ap- 
proached, , four hufdted thillions ; 
but, to counterbalance them, the 
landed possessions of the state ‘a- 
mounted to more than six hundred. 
Great Britain, doubtless, abounded 
in resources }. but, what were those 
of our allies? > Did they not explicit. 
ly acknowledge that they depended 
on our treasures for the maintenance 
of their armies in prosecuting this 
war? Were they not, therefore, ra. 
ther mercenaries, thane allies, fight. 
ing for pay, and not from principle? 
Could we trust'such édnfederates ? 
Had not a prinaipal one of: ee al. 
Vis 
4 
REGISTER, 
1795. 
lies betrayed us, in the most scandal. 
ous manner, and materially injured 
the interests of the coalition? Thus 
we were undeniably reduced to the 
necessity of supporting every one 
of our confederates, with the alarm. 
ing reflection, that we could not 
place the least reliance upon any 
one of them. Was this a situation 
to be embraced by a people who 
were not governed by the most fatal 
delusion? Ought not the consider- 
ation of these various circumstances 
induce us to listen to those who 
hold up the propriety of terminating 
the contest, upon any terms that 
were safe and honourable, rather 
tigin to continue it at an expence 
that must ultimately invelve us in 
the most cbvious and unavoidable 
danger? To treat was not to sub- 
mit: ifthe french, grown-presump- 
tuous from our moderation, should 
make unreasonable demands, it 
would become our duty to refuse 
them ;/and the magnanimity of the 
British nation would cordially adopt 
every measure that a spirited minis. 
try might think proper to propose. 
To these and other allegations, 
Mr. Pitt replied, that, notwithstand. 
ing the French had been so success 
ful, there was no motive sufficiently 
strong toinduce this country to look 
upon the’ affairs of the coalition as 
in a state of danger: he would 
not, therefore, swerve, in the least, 
from his resolution to move, that it 
was the determination of the house 
to prosecute the war, as the only 
means of procuring a permanent 
and secure peace; relying on a vi- 
gorous employment of the force of 
this country, to effect a pacification 
with France, under any govern- 
ment: capable of maintaining” the 
relations of peace and amity: This 
‘surely, said Mr. Pitt, was not toin- 
sist 
