HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
sist’on the restoration of the old 
monarchy, as.an indispensable con- 
dition of peace. He eagerly main- 
tained, that the perils attending thé 
present war, did not equal those 
that would result from such a peace 
as could be made between the two 
countries, at this uncertain crisis. 
The internal situation of France, 
and the well-known disposition of 
its rulers, rendered every compact 
with them precarious and unstable. 
‘Terror and severity, though some- 
"what abated since te fall of Robers- 
_ pierre, still subsisted in full force, 
and parties were still animated 
‘against each other, toa degree that 
_ eft them no other security for ther 
Tespective existence, than the de. 
struction of their antagonists, whose 
_ ‘measurestheyobstinatel yreprobated, 
“as tending to the destruction of the 
‘commonwealth. While such were 
‘the reciprocal sentiments of these 
furious and implacable enemies to 
veach other, whatever was effected 
‘by the one would be controverted 
‘by the other, as injurious to the 
“state; and annulled on the very 
first opportunity. Could, therefore, 
/any other state securely rest on the 
_ faith of any contraét or stipulation 
-made with people of this character? 
Until another system took place of 
“this one, he could not ‘think him- 
_ self authorized in reason to enter 
‘into any negotiation with thosewho 
Yheld the reins of government, in 
midst of such incessant flu@tua- 
‘tions. A powerful proof, how great 
» the number was of those, in France, 
who were inimical to the present go- 
~ -vernment, evidently appeared inthe » 
x a odigious sums levied by confisca- 
: : the eoaien a been és, 
“during ‘the foresoing’-year and a 
Ube, Cohanoaheee ‘hUndtéd., ‘millions 
pping’ 'Di Worthis "sufficiently »the discontented and factious 
fiss 
evince the fallacy, or the error, of 
those who asserted the inconsiderable 
quantity of adherents to monarchy ? 
‘These were, toa man, the friends 
to this country, and waited only an 
occasion to declare themselves ready 
to second our efforts in their cause. 
Would it be policy to deprive’ our- 
selves of the good wishes’ aad co- 
operation of the multitudes, whom 
no terrors nor barbarities had been 
able to reduce to any degree of sub. 
mission to the existing system? but/ 
were we disposed to negotiate with 
the French republicans, could we 
be certain of a similar disposition 
on their part? was it not notorious, 
that they harboured an irreconcile- 
able hatred to this country, and its 
inhabitants ; and that the’ principal 
motive of their willingness to make 
‘peace with the other members of 
the confederacy, was, that, they 
might convert their whole rage 
against us ? would they not interpose 
such obstructions’ to a pacification, 
that it “must remain unattainable 
without sacrificing, at once,. both 
our honour and our’ dnterest to ob. 
tain ic?) The very principles on 
which the French republic. was 
founded, were. such, that to ac- 
knowledge it, which must be done 
in case of -a\treaty, was to. confess 
all other governments:founded upon 
injustice. “A peace built on such 
grounds would be not only disgrace- 
ful, but fatal to our own constitu. 
tion, by undermining its principles, 
and empowering its many domestic 
‘enemies to represent it-as inequi. 
table and oppressive. Such a peace 
would be worse than war. French 
emissaries, under’ the-various pre- 
»tences’ of ‘business’ and commercial 
transactions, - would. be let loose 
upon us in swarms} and, united with 
here, 
would 
