“HISTORY OF EUROPE. [198 
Considered as a powerful argument 
for the necessity of counteraéting 
them, and of exerting the strength 
of Great Britain, in opposition to 
its most inveterate enemy. 
The marquis of -Lansdowne ex- 
‘pressed himself with his usval fer- 
vour against ministerial measures. 
He was particularly severe on the 
frequent refusal of ministers to lay 
before the house copies of in- 
structions to admirals and generals. 
This practice had begun, he ob- 
served, in the reign of George I. 
to the high disgrace of parliament; 
of which it had greatly wounded 
the dignity in the eyes of the na- 
tion. It was incumbent on this 
body to assert the right it had en- 
joyed till that period, of claiming, 
without denial, a participation in 
the knowledge of those public docu- 
ments, on which alone. it could 
form a clear conception of the pro- 
priety of ministerial measures in 
‘matters of the most essential conse- 
quence. The marquis entered with 
great accuracy into an examination 
of the relative interests of the chief 
European powers. He represented 
the desire of Russia, to form acon- 
“‘hexion with England, as flowing 
“from the dread entertained by that 
power, that the poientates of Eu- 
rope were meditating an union 
against this overgrown empire, in 
order to set bounds to its ambition. 
‘This was a measure of such ne- 
eessity, that it were the height ofim- 
policy tocounteract it. But no na- 
tion could so effectually oppose the 
nterprises of Russia, as the Ger- 
‘mans assisted by the French, who 
had always been the surest friends to 
the independence of the German 
“princes. This connexion ought not 
therefore to be disturbed, nor the 
French prevented from ating the 
part they had already done in be- 
half of Germany, merely on ac- 
count of their having changed. the 
form of theit government, from 
monarchical to republican. The ine 
terests of France were invariably 
the same, whether a monarchy or a. 
republic: but the infatuation of 
those who opposed the establishment 
of the republic, might induce it, in 
order to attain that objet, to conz 
nive at the pretensions of its princi- 
pal enemies, and permit them to 
swallow up the smaller states of the 
German empire, provided the 
settlement of the republic was no 
longer obstructed. ‘The prospects 
that arose from this new arrange- 
ment of things, were, in the opinion 
of the marquis, more critical than 
any alterations that had happened 
in the course of many centuries. 
It was easy to foresee, that if France 
allowed the greater powers to adopt 
thesystem ot partition, they must in 
return permit the same to the 
French. Thus Europe would be 
thrown into a state of confusion 
highly unfavourable to the interests 
of this country, which evidently re- 
quired that the political situation 
of Europe should remain as hereto- 
fore, and that nod power whatever 
should be aggrandized at the ex- 
pence of another. The greater 
the number of smaller powers, the 
greater must be the safety and in- 
fluence of Great Britains Were 
Europe to be divided, on the par- 
titioning plan in contemplation at 
the ambitious courts well known to 
desire it, no peace could henceforth 
be lasting or secure, The thirst of 
dominion once excited, and partially 
gratified, would never rest, and the 
dividers .of states and kingdoms 
[O22] would, 
