HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
ple being willing to acceptiof a go- 
vernment upon compulsion. but 
did our allies require from us 2 con. 
tinuation of this war? Were they 
not all inclined to peace? Was it 
not also a fact, that so fsz from ex. 
tinguishing jacobinism ov fo coun. 
try, which was one of the most com- 
mon pretences for the war in those 
who approved it, those who went 
under that name rejoiced in its con- 
tinuance, from the-prospect it af- 
forded of accelerating the ruin of 
Ministry, and of the party that 
sided with them, and of promoting 
all the views of their adversaries. 
The good faith of the French was 
at least equal to that-we had ex- 
perienced from our allies: were the 
French to deceive us, they would do 
no more than had been done by our 
allies under the mask of friendship 
to this country, and after having, 
through that pretence, drained it of as 
much treasure as they could prevail 
on our credulity in their promises to 
bestow. We had sufficiently felt 
theevils of war: those prognosti- 
cated from peace had no existence 
but in the speculations of persons 
who did not feel the calamities of 
the times: but ‘ought the mere 
speculations of men in power to 
outweigh the contrary opinions of 
the great mass of the community ? 
among whom it were an insult to 
common sense and experience to 
deny, that as much knowledge and 
understanding might be found as in 
any ministry. 
It was argued by Mr. Pirt in re. 
ply, that to representit as ‘the duty ' 
-of ministers, to acknowledge them. 
selves ready to accept of overtures 
et peace from the enemy, was tak. 
ng from them the advantages they 
ought to possess in relation to them: 
they must, from their situation, best 
(199 
know the language tovbe held with 
him. For this reason the constitus 
tion had invested the executive 
power with the exclusive right of 
foreign negotiations, from the supe. 
rior degree of information it could 
not fail to derive through the. vari. 
ous channels of which it had the 
sole direétion. From sources of this 
nature proceeded the reluctance of 
government, to comply with the 
opinion of those who were desirous 
to shew a willingness to treat with 
the rulers in France. From “au., ’ 
thentic intelligence, the situation of . 
that country was more critical than 
ever: the resources were universally 
diminished in every quarter from 
whence they had arisen, or been ex.” 
torted. Disunion reigned in every 
department of the state, and dissatis. 
faction extended through all classes. 
Was this, therefore, a time to come 
forward with proposals tonegotiate, 
while, through the patient delay of a 
short lapse of time, alterations. 
might happen in the internal parts 
of thatcguntry, more favourable to 
us, than we could expect from the 
most advantageous treaties that 
could be framed at the present mo- 
ment? To negotiate now would 
therefore be precipitation and im. 
prudence unbecoming the discretion 
of government, while so thoroughly 
acquainted with the diminution of 
strength in the enemy, and that not. 
withstanding the apparent vigour 
and success of his exertions, they 
could not last much longer. This 
description of the state of France he 
compared with that of England, of | 
which the resources still remained 
unexhausted, and where, though 
impositions had been numerous, 
they had notdepressed the industry, 
nor affected the general welfare of 
society. The debate closed by the 
[94] order 
