MILLAR’S HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. 
philosophic as to be mortifying ; yet his 
reflections evince deep penetration, and 
his discussions a discriminating subtlety. 
It was the intention of the author to 
have divided his commentary on the 
period subsequent to the accession of the 
house of Stuart into two parts: the first 
“comprehending the history of those con- 
tests between prerogative and privilege, 
which by the Revolution in 1688 were 
terminated in a manner so consonant 
with the spirit of the nation, and so 
satisfactory to the happiness of the peo- 
ple: the second containing the rise and 
progress of the influence of the crown, 
an influence which, though in some mea- 
sure checked by the general diffusion of 
knowledge, and the advancement of the 
arts, was to become the more dangerous 
to the constitution, as its slow and in- 
sensible advances are less apt to excite 
attention. This second part only is im- 
perfect ; a loss the more to be lamented 
by every friend to literature and liberty ; 
as it would no doubt have contained 
practicable suggestions for the remedy of 
a grievance which is, in our own times, 
the critical distemper, the baleful com- 
piaint, the gnawing cancer of the coun- 
’ try- P 
To the work is prefixed, an eloquent 
dedication to Mr. Fox: it may be con- 
sidered as the parting advice of disin- 
terested wisdom, and will encourage 
the pupils of the philosopher to rely on 
that statesman for the indication of the 
appropriate remedy for the disorders of 
the constitution of the country. 
From thoseportions of the work, 
which have already attained, in the pub- 
lic estimation, a classical rank, it would 
be needless to select specimens : we pass 
on, therefore, to some characteristic 
reflections on the execution of Charles 
the First. 
«< The trial and execution of Charles was 
doubtless intended for the purpose of intro- 
ducing a republican form of government ; 
and according as we bold such a revolution 
to have been expedient, or the contrary, we 
shall be led to condemn, or approve of that 
measure. 
** Concerning the general question, whe- 
ther 2 government of this nature was, at 
that period, accommodated to the cireum- 
stances of the English nation, it may be dif- 
ficult to form a decisive opinion. Many 
politicians have asserted, that a republican 
constitution is peculiarly adapted toa small 
state, and cannot be maintained in a large 
community. This doctrine seems to. have 
arisen froma view of the ancient republics, 
255 
in which the whole people composed the 
legislative assembly ; and is abaonget | inap- 
plicable to those modern systems of demo~ 
cracy, in which the legislative power is) 
committed to national representatives. No- 
thing is more common than for philosophers 
to be imposed upon by the different aecepta- 
tion of words. ‘The nations of antiquity 
having no notion of a representative govern- 
ment, countries of large extent were subject- 
ed universally to an arbitrary and slovenly. 
despotism ; and it was only in a few small 
states that it was thought practicable for the 
mass of the people to retain, in their own 
hands, the supreme powers of public admi- 
nistration. ‘The expedient, employed first 
in modern times, of substituting representa- 
tives, in place of the whole people, to exer- 
cise the supreme powers in the state, has 
removed the difficulty of communicating a 
popular constitution to countries of a great 
extent ; as it may prevent the legislative as- 
sembly from being too numerous, either for 
maintaining good order in its deliberations, 
or for superintending the conduct of the 
chief executive officers. 
«« If, by a republic, is meant a govern- 
ment in which there is no king, or heredi- 
ditary chief magistrate, it should seem, that 
this political system is peculiarly adapted to 
the two extremes, of a very small and a very 
reat nation. Ina very small state, no other 
ate of government can subsist. Suppose 
a territory, containing no more than $0,000 
inhabitants, and these paying taxes, one 
with another, at the rate of thirty shillings 
yearly ; this would producea public revenue, 
at the disposal of the crown, amounting an- 
nually to 45,000]. a sum totally insufficient 
for supporting the dignity and authority of 
the crown, and for bestowing on the king 
an influence superior to that which might 
be possessed by casual combinations of 2 
few of his richest subjects. . 
«© Smppose, on the other hand, a terri- 
tory sy exiensive and populous as to contain 
thirty millions of inhabitants, paying taxes 
in the same proportion; -this, at the free 
disposal of a king, would bestow upon him 
an annual revenue, so enormous as to create 
adegree of patronage and influence which 
no regulations could eflectually restrain, and 
would render every attempt to limit the 
powers of the crown in a great measure vain 
and insignificant. -In such a state, there- 
fore, it seems extremely difficult to maintain 
the natural rights of mankind otherwise than 
by abolishing monarchy altogether. ‘Thuss 
in a very small state, a denrocratical govern- 
ment is necessary, beca se the king would 
have too litile authority ; in avery great ones. 
because he would have toe. much. In 4 
state of moderate size, lying in a certain me- 
dium between the two exiremes,:it should 
seem, that monarchy may be) established. 
with advantage, and that the crown may bé 
expected to possess a sufficient share of aus . 
thority for its own presetyation, without 
