CLARKE’S VIEW OF THE DISORGANIZATION OF EUROPE. 
nadle; appointed inspectors general, and 
afterwards directors, for the strict mainte- 
nance of military discipline; instituted mili- 
tary honours, which are more desired than 
pecuniary rewards ; and to crown his mili- 
tary system and his endeavotrs to be well 
served, he instituted the hospital for invalids. 
«© Thus his armies became through the ar- 
yangements of this great military system, the 
astonishment of all and the terror of many 
of the nations of Europe! Such numerous 
troops had never before been seen. He kept 
in pay, says Voltaire, 450,000 men. From 
the time of Mazarine’s death to that of his 
own, he was engaged ina course of wars, 
which lasted nearly thirty years. His navy 
consistéd of 780 ships, of which there were 
110 of theline. But by the good policy and 
valor of Britain, Sweden, and Prussia, the 
balance of power was, notwithstanding, pre- 
served from annihilation. In order to meet 
the magnitude of the danger, and to guard 
against meditated surprise, Prussia beheld at 
once her sole security, and the true basis of 
peace in the strength’of her armies. Hence 
therefore the remedy was proportioned to the 
evil; but the necessity of this conduct was 
_ forced upon her from the quarter where the 
example originated. The agen had been 
even perfected in France before it had been 
thought of in Prussia. So vast, so com- 
lete was the military system of Lewis, that 
oltaire says, the troops of all his enemies 
were not so numerous; they certainly were 
not so strongly united, and thus he had 
always great successes or great resources. 
The genius of the sovereign of Prussia, did 
not content itself however with forming a 
vast military machine; he contemplated and 
he discovered the modes of making it act 
with new energy in war and advantage in 
eace. His improvement in tactics fol- 
owed, of which his enemies can tell the 
eee. The burden, which results from the 
_ support of armies, he made these armies 
* compensate by their utility, not merely with 
respect to the repulsion of external eee. 
or the support of internal security. But his 
army, which was not disproportioned to his 
ordinary revenues, for his treasures aceumu- 
lated by an annual surplus, was divided in 
the provinces, and not in the towns, or on 
the frontiers. His great object was to render 
this army truly national, and thereby in- 
vineible, and without interfering with rural 
cultivation. He sent them therefore to their 
Telations, and to their homes, to devote 
themselves to agriculture during ten or eleven 
months of the year. Thus his army em- 
sing between the sword and thé plough- 
te, became soldiers renowned in war, 
and agriculturists useful in peace, and did 
Ot prove burthensome to the country. 
_ . Mr. Hauterive, therefore, has fallen 
: into more than one great error on this head. 
’ 
r 
First, Prussia did not set the example of the 
tailitary system and its numerous standing 
@timies: it was France. And, next, in 
Ann. Rey. Vou. II. 
305 
France, it certainly proved an evil of the 
most mischieyous magnitude. Whereas in 
Prussia it proved a’ good of the first import- 
ance, not solely with respect to Prussia it- 
self, but to Germany and Europe. For 
under the military system divested of its poi- 
son by the sagacity of the monarch, the 
Prussian nation has grown and prospered, 
and has not declined into disorganization 
and revolution. Mr. Hauterive, however, 
asserts that this greatness of Prussia became 
pernicious te Germany and to Europe; and 
that by its influence and example it created 
wars in the one, and disorganization in the 
other. History informs us, on the contrary, 
that from the period of the establishment of 
Prussian greatness to the present one, it did 
not create wars in the empire ; for there have 
been no wars amongst the princes, as Mr. 
Hauterive affirms. Arid it is the growth and 
preponderance of Prussia which prevented 
these wars. They must have infallibly 
arisen out of the internal dissentions of the 
empire, had it not been for the intervention 
of this power. 
«« Let us now examine how far this gen- 
tleman is likewise erroneous, when he asserts 
that Prussia first taught to the princes of 
Europe that gold circulated in their countries 
only to enrich their treasury. The historical 
panegyrist of Lewis XIV. informs us, that 
when this monarch lay on the bed of death 
and held his successor in his arms, he ut- 
tered these remarkable words to him, which 
could have proceeded but from his revolving 
within himself all his military and financial 
operations: ‘ I have been too fond of war— 
imitate me not in that—no more than in 
my too great expences.’ He, to whom 
they were uttered, preserved them in writ- 
ing at the head of his bed. But let Mr 
Hauterive direct his researches a little fur- 
ther, and he will perceive the history of 
France informing him that the system of 
finance, which gave in France such a perni- 
cious facility to answer any sudden demand 
for war, was introduced by Catherine de 
Meilicis, abolished under Henry LY. revived 
under Lewis XIII. and so fatally enfeebled 
the latter times of Lewis XIV. that about 
the years 1691 and 1692 the finances.were 
in extreme disorder. And on this occasion 
the historian cbserves, ‘it is only war that 
impoverishes a state.” Since the time of the 
ancient Romans, I know of no_ nation that 
has enriched itself by its victories. Italy in 
the sixteenth century, owed its weaith en- 
tirely to its commerce. Holland would have 
subsisted but a very short time, had it looked 
no farther than the seizure of the Spanish 
plate fleets. The Algerines, who support 
themselves by their piracies, are a very 
wretched people. Among the European 
nations, war, after a certain term of years, 
reduces the congueror to the same distress 
with the conquered.” 
A’ better defence of the maritime sys- 
Xx 
