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formerly, under the Beldwins, held that em- 
pire for a time at Constantinople) would be 
thus acquired, together with the power of | 
universal arbitration; an object far morc 
valuable in the estimation of the wise than 
universal monarchy itself.” 
This is further corroborated by those 
lines in the epistle of Leibnitz to Mons. 
de Scuderi, written in November, 1697, 
in which the philosopher thus mentions 
the monarch. 
‘Les héros, tels que lui, sont de tous les 
pays 5 
Ot leur nom peut aller, ils ont les coeurs 
souls. 
Cette mon: re tie est la seule universelle, 
Tt de celle de Dieu le plus juste modele. . 
Et Louis etant tel, l'aurait eté toujours, 
Sans le destin fatal au repos de nos jours. 
O necessaire mal, politique facheuse, 
Vos soupeons ont rendu Europe malheu- 
reuse: 
‘Plus Louis est le Grand, plus chacun allarmé 
Avance, en repoussant, le désastre Goigné. 
Indeed all the connexions of Leibnitz 
favour the suspicion, that he was no cor- 
dial friend to French aggrandizement, 
but was very willing to owe to French 
enquiry the information he coveted about 
‘the supposed resemblance of the Arme- 
nian and the Egyptian dialect, and the 
possibility of explaining in Coptic the 
names of the Roman divinities. In the 
HISTORY, POLITICS, AND STATISTICS. 
letter to the Abbé de Saint Pierre, on 
the project of a perpetual peace, he says 
the best way to realize it would be to 
assist the emperor in driving the Turks 
out of Europe, which is a glaring per- 
siflage. Itis, therefore, not at all impro- 
bable that his archness, like that of So- 
crates, often passed for earnest; and 
eluded suspicion by its apparent hetero- 
geneity to his character. 
Instead of viewing the project of 
Leibnitz as a philosophic fenfire, exhal- 
ing in order to infatuate and mislead, 
and dazzle and bemire the: French na-~ 
tion, this editor seems to consider it 
neither as an ironical, nor as’ an un- 
sound project. He chooses for his motto 
the line of Lucan, 
fEgyptum certe Latiis tueamur ab armis ! 
and would have this country take the 
idle trouble of ridding the Copts of their 
new mamelukes. Let us, on the con- 
trary, open toward the south side the 
barrier. cates of Europe ; and, if possible, 
induce France to pursue her aggrandize- 
ment in any other direction ratherthan | 
along the northern coast. By the pos+q 
session of Holland, the security and in- -— 
dependence of Great-Britain is far more 
seriously threatened than it would be 
by the annexation of the whole Roman 
empire besides to France. 
Aart. XXI. The French considered as a Military Nation, since the Commencement of 
their Revolution 3 exhibiting by their Conduct towards Europe in general, a serious Warn- 
ing to Gireat-Britain: with a proposed Plan to Hut the Troops, Se. 
THESE patriotic pages are address- 
“ed to the navy, army, and volunteers of 
the United Kingdom: they are penned 
by some one well acquainted with what 
may be called the generic character of 
.a French soldier. Their avowed object 
‘is, to shew to the British army and the 
‘English people at large, what French 
‘soldiers really are, how they have been 
‘commanded, and’ by what extraordinary 
means they have been rendered subser- 
vient to every project.of ambition. ‘The 
courage and bravery of the French are 
not underrated, but it is truly remarked 
that much of their success may be ascrib- 
ed to other causes than ascendency in 
valour, or superiority in military skill. 
They, as well as their enemies, have. 
~ often committed the grossest blunders, 
but the latter were not always so ready 
“te profit by them, — 
It is stated here, that the revolution 
Svo. pp. 72. 
“has destroyed the science of artillery, » 
or engineering, in France.” The French 
are a military nation, and every thing 
connected with tactics -is a subject of 
importance to them. "To their flying ar- 
tillery, composed of the best and bravest 
ef their soldiers, the French are avow- 
edly indebted for the majority of their 
victories. If it is true that the revolu- 
tion disorganized the military, as well 
asevery other branch of the government, 
there is yet every presumption that they 
will now use the ancient tactics as the 
basis of a modern superstructure. ‘The 
Dépit de la Guerre is at this time under 
the direction of that accomplished gene- 
ral, Andreossy: it is an establishment 
likely to be attended with incalculable 
advantages to the enemy, and which 
cannot too strongly be recommended as 
a model for imitation to the British go- 
vernment. Sas est ef ab baste doceri. This 
