THE QUESTION, WHY 
after affect the union happily re-established 
between the two nations?’ Was it possible 
to maintain that union under such continued 
irritation? And what was required, or ra- 
ther what was solicited? Mr. Otto’s note 
(p- 39, Official Correspondence) says, ‘ the 
undersigned has in consequence received a 
special order to solicit, 
« That his Majesty’s government will adopt 
the most effectual measures to put a stop to 
the unbecoming and seditious publications 
with which the newspapers and other writ- 
ings in England are filled.’ 
« Ts this then called requiring our laws 
and constitution to be changed ?—and what 
is ouranswer? We begin by.accusing them 
of want of temper (vide Lord Hawkesbury’s 
letter, page 41) ; acknowledge that very im- 
proper paragraphs have been inseried in our 
newspapers, and publications of a still more 
improper and indecent nature, appeared under 
the signature of foreigners: that the French 
have thought proper to resort to recrimina- 
tion. We then talk highly of the liberty of 
our press 5 insinuate we mean to continue to 
abuse them: but they need not read our 
pamphlets or newspapers unless they like it, 
or admit them into their country, but punish 
those who do. The French are silent: they 
mention the subject no.more. Wecall our- 
selyes insulted, go to war, and adduce the re- 
quisition as one of the causes. 
« Fifthly, The presumption ofafirming that 
Great Britain cannot singly contend against 
the power of France, is too puerile to be com- 
mented upon: it was unworthy the dignity 
ef a great nation to make the assertion, and 
unworthy that of another, gravely to bring it 
forward among the causes for war. I should 
not have thought it worth while to have 
brought the maiter to the test, had the Chief 
Consul, in still more boyish frolic affirmed, 
- ‘he would fight us with one hand tied be- 
ind him.’ 
_ ** The subsequent paragraph in the same 
paper of communication (Official Corre- 
spondence, p. xxili), is more worth our at- 
tention. 
_ * But we have better hopes; and we be- 
lieve in the British cabinet nothing will be 
listened to but the counsels of wisdom, and 
the voice of humanity.” 
___*£ Sixthly.—Manilesto published in the 
Hamburgh Gazette.—It is not a little sur- 
prising to find inserted in the catalogue of 
@ilences, this manifesto; for upon our de- 
mand of immediate satisfaction, every autho- 
tity from the French government for the 
_ publication of it was dented, and most com- 
_ pletely disavowed (vide Official Correspond- 
ence, p. 127). Upon our further insisting 
that, as the insult was public, so must be the 
‘reparation. M. ‘Talleyrand answered: ¢ the 
First Consul considered M. Rheinhardt’s con- 
duct so reprehensible, that every satisfaction 
might be expected!’ i 
“If then the paper was really published 
by order of the First Consul, we have the as- 
DO WE GO TO WAR? 339 
crifice of truth on the altar of Peace. What 
would we have more? A futile argument is 
sometimes made use of, that these causes are 
nothing if singly taken, but altogether amount 
to a sufficient one. But if individually 
they are nothing, and are proved to be so, 
can an aggregate of nothings ever amount to 
any thing? 
«« Does there yet then appear a reason why 
we go to war?” 
Under the seventh head, which is dis- 
cussed in the least satisfactory manner, 
the author considers the charge of ag- 
grandizement. 
«« One cannot but be grieved that a peo- 
ple so generous, a country so delightful as 
Switzerland, should wither under the gripe 
of despotism and oppression; and it would 
have been a gallant piece of Quixotism to 
have prevented such a fate by our assistance, 
if possible. We endeavoured to do it, broke 
our treaty to do it, retook the Cape of Good 
Hope, and would have dashed precipitately 
into war, could we have got the other powers 
to have joined. We might then indeed have 
entered into an impolitic war with honour, 
repel violence and aggression ; whereas now 
we plunge into an impolitic war, with all the 
odium of aggression and breach of faith upon 
our backs. We remonstrated in favour of 
the Swiss; but the Swiss submitted, and we 
said no more. How then is this business, 
which was settled in October, 1802, bronght 
up again as a cause for war in May 1803? 
«< We did all we conld to get info a war 
for an object politically of no consequence to 
us: indeed the possession of Switzerland by 
the French, is a manifest advantage to this 
country: it oceapies their troops, removes 
them farther from us; gives them a territory 
they must always be upon the alert to retain, 
subject to perpetual insurrection and revolt. 
Jt is a different case with Holland. The pos- 
session of Holland by the French, might be 
of material ill consequence to us; but there 
was no stipulation in our treaty of Amiens, 
that the First Consul should withdraw his 
troops from thence ; they lingered there, to the 
annoyance of the Dutch, and jealousy of our 
government; the greatest part of them undoubt- 
edly intended for the expeditions to Louisiana 
and St. Domingo (would we had let them 
quietly embark for those places!) The Dutch 
made some remonstrances (urging their de- 
varture), in which we would have joined, 
ai they wished us to desist, for fear of draw- 
ing down upon them the fate of Switzerland 
(vide Mr. Liston’s Letter, p. 201). Bona- 
arte afterwards declared he would withdraw 
is troops, the moment the treaty of Amiens 
was fully completed on our part, and Malta 
evacuated according to agreement. We how- 
ever do not fulfil our treaty, but go to war. 
‘The French seize their territory, and we thei. 
ships. So much for the Dutch 
«< When the French are accused of annex- 
Z 2 
i. - 
