* 
WHEATLEY’S REMARKS ON CURRENCY AND COMMERCE. 
fail to supply. Thus the Baconian me- 
thod of philosophising is precisely in- 
verted: instead of taking our conclu- 
sions from experience, we take our expe- 
rience from conclusions, and invent a 
mass of 4 priori opinion, which Aristote- 
lic philosophists would denominate truth. 
We are told in the preface, that these 
remarks on currency and commerce are 
offered to the public, more as the pros- 
pectus of a future work, than asa dis- 
tinet treatise in its present shape. They 
are subdivided into six chapters, of 
which the first proposes to demonstrate, 
1, That an increase of the national stock 
of specie is an increase of currency, and 
not of capital; 2. That an increase of 
currency, is not an increase of wealth ; 
and 3. That no one nation can possess a 
reater relative currency than another. 
The second chapter treats of the balance 
of trade; the third on commerce; the 
fourth on the depreciation of money ; 
the fifth on the reformation of the paper 
currency of this country ; and the con- 
cluding chapter, on the reduction of the 
national debt by the depression of mo- 
ney. 
It is to the fifth chapter of this work 
that the public attention ought princi, 
pally to be drawn; because the author 
has there ventured to found on theoretical 
principles, often equivocal and sometimes 
unintelligible,a most important and most 
dangerous practical counsel. In a sea- 
gon of alarm like the present, under mi- 
nisters like the present, rash counsels 
may find admission; and the slowly 
accumulated prosperity of centuries may 
be annihilated ata blow. This author 
contends for no less than the total sup- 
pression of the country-banks ; and for 
conferring on the bank of England a 
monopoly of the whole paper-circulation 
of Great Britain. We shall extract this 
prodigious speculation. 
«« Tn this review, I shall endeavour to prave 
that the paper of country banks must ever 
forin an inefficient and dangerous medium 
of circulation, from its liability to sudden 
contraction in the period of alarm ; and its 
tendency to as sudden an increase in the 
moment of security ; and that its continu- 
ance is inconsistent with the stability of the 
national bank, and the general interests of 
the country. Fh ct 
. ** Between the termination of the Ameri- 
can and the commencement of the late war, 
country banks were instituted in all the prin- 
cipal towns of the kingdom; and up to the 
year 1793, their notes had a free and easy 
circulation, without exciting much public 
363 
uneasiness ; though the bank entertained 
an_early prejudice against them, from the 
difficulties which were likely to ensue to their 
own establishment. Upon the breaking out 
of the war, and the first tendency to alarm 
in the public mind, their stability was put 
to the test. The mere agitation occasioned 
by such an event, was sufficient to excite a 
suspicion of their credit: and, when once 
excited its suppression was impracticable : 
though at first partial and insignificant, it 
spread with irresistible rapidity, and increased 
in force as it increased in extent. The 
greater part of their notes was instantly con= 
tracted, and the currency of the country was 
reduced to such a degree, as to cause the ut- 
most distress from an insufficiency of means 
to effeet the customary payments. It is im- 
possible for me to calculate the quantity 
withdrawn from the purposes of circulation : 
but I should not think that the reduction 
would be overstated at three millions. This 
sudden contraction of so large a proportion 
of our circulating medium, necessarily dis- 
abled the fulfilment of engagements, and 
roduced an extent of calamity unparalleled 
in the history of this, or any other couniry. 
No less than one thousarid three hundred 
and four bankruptcies were the consequence 
of the reduction, 
“« In this ¢risis, they made application to 
the bank of England for relief. But as the 
directors were alarmed at the difficulties that 
threatened their own institution, from the 
preceding issue of their paper, assistance was 
refused. The metropolis soon became dis- 
tressed in the same proportion with the 
country towns ; as great part of its currency 
was withdrawn to fill the chasm which had 
been made in the currency of the other parts 
of the kingdom. The mischief, already 
extensive beyond all former precedent, was 
likely to be productive of still greater cala- 
mity, had not° government interposed to 
arrest its progress: the issue of exchequer 
bilis was peculiarly necessary at this juncture, 
they provided the country with its due pro- 
portion of currency, and prevented any fur- 
ther extension of the mischief. 
**Though many country banks escaped 
‘without injury in the general shock, yet none 
were free from alarm. None could iell how 
soon the blow might be repeated, nor what 
degree of injury it might be capable of effect- 
ing. As soon as the public consternation 
subsided, they took the only means in their 
power to provide against the evil which might 
result from its return, by securing a con- 
nection with the London bankers. By this 
connection, they were enabled to procure 
the support of the bank of England, not- 
withstanding its repugnance to assist them. 
Though, previous to the suspension of cash 
payments, no private London banker applied 
for assistance in his own name, as the appli- 
cation might have been-deemed a reflection 
on his credit ; yet assistance was easily pro- 
eured, by requesting his customers to send 
