\ 
10] 
The Austrians had now posted 
themselves in force at Lavis,-in- 
tending to:stop the progress of the 
French, by occupying the other side 
of the river Lavisio; but this in- 
tention was frustrated, by the rapid 
advance of Joubert, who forced 
them from this important position, 
after sustaining a great loss of their 
best troops, and. in particular of a 
select carps of Hungarians. Here 
the division of Joubert was reinforc- 
ed by that of Massena, who had 
been equally successful; and in his 
pursuit of the Austrians, after the 
action at Carpanadolo, had taken 
several places of strength, and dri- 
ven them to the other side of the 
Pradas, after seizing a large part of 
their baggage. 
The Imperial armies were now 
totally expelled from Italy, and no- 
\ thing remained to the emperor but 
the city of Mantua, which was so 
closely blockaded, and so vigo- 
reusly pressed, that no supplies of 
pnw or of men, could enter. 
he garrison, despairing of all re- 
lief, began to think it time to sur-. 
render. Weakened by the great 
slaughter it had suffered in so many 
sallies, and by a contagions distem- 
per, that committed great ravages 
in the city, the Austrians agreed, 
at length, to a capitulation, upon 
the second day of February. The 
terms were as honourable as the de- 
fence had been brave. The French 
general shewed a laudable propen- 
sity to pay due regard to the merit 
of his rival, who, notwithstanding 
his late ill success, was deservedly 
esteemed a warrior of the most dis- 
tinguished rank, He granted him 
an escort of two hundred horse and 
seven hundred footy: whom he was 
permitted to select, together with 
thirty pieces of artillery ; the gene- 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1797. 
rals, and principal officers under — 
him, were allowed, in like manner, 
to accompany him on their parole; - 
the rest of the garrison ' remained 
prisoners of war. 
The northern parts of the papal 
territories were already in the 
possession of the French, and it 
was expected that as soon as Buo- 
naparte was free from inquietude, 
( 
.on account of the Austrian armies 
still hovering on the borders of 
Germany, and»had. secured the 
capture of Mantua, he would ims 
mediately proceed to, Rome itself, 
and dictate the conditions of a 
/ peace. 
The pope, in the mean. time, 
relied upon the exertions of the , 
emperor, and had determined®to 
wait the issue of the operations of 
his army, under Alvinzi, firmly 
hoping that it would be more suc- 
cessful than those that had preceded 
it. Buonaparte was sincerely de- 
sirous of a pacification with» the 
head of the Romish church, a re- 
spectful treatment of whom would, 
he was conscious, be highly gratify- 
ing to all the Roman catholic states 
and people. Prompted by these 
motives, and intirely averse to co- 
ercive measures, he wrote a letter 
to cardinal Mattzi, prime. minister 
to his holiness, requesting him 
to prevail on the pope to recom- 
mence pacific negociations, in ors 
der to prevent the march of the . . 
French armies into his territories, 
and to represent to him the inutility 
of arming his subjects against men 
who had overcome so many formid+ 
able enemies, and whom his own 
people were wholly incayole ta 
resist. 
- This letter was dated the twenty- 
sixth of October, 1796. Buona- 
parte was then preparing ta march 
against 
