HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
this purpose, formed a total of little 
less than one hundred thousand men, 
and every appearance indicated, 
that nothing but a conviction of the 
unsurmountable difficulties attend- 
ing it would put a stop to the un- 
dertaking. The directory saw these; 
but, unwilling to discourge the 
multitude, by acknowledging that 
the two great victories, gained by 
admirals Jervis and Duncan, had 
wholly disconcerted their projects, 
they still continued to wear the 
semblance of a determination to per- 
sist, at all hazards, jn a fixed resolve 
to try the strength of the English, 
in England itself. Such were the 
words of the directory, and of their 
supporters, both in and out of the 
councils. Arguments, for the pro- 
bability of success, were copiously 
drawn from the sources of ancient 
and modern history: but they af- 
forded nothing convincing to judi- 
cious observers: as the resemblances 
of times and circumstances were far 
from apposite, no strict inferences 
¢ould be drawn, and only conjec- 
tures formed, according, as usual, 
awith the wishes of those who made 
them. The warmth of the French 
in describing the multifarious means _ 
they would employ to compass the 
great pointof landing, was contrast- 
ed with the coolness of the Euglish, 
in allowing its feasibility, but in 
urging, at the same time, the pro- 
bability, or rather, the certainty of 
no force being puton shore, that 
would not have to encounter one 
much greater, and better provided. 
The circumstance of being inexpe- 
rienced, so much insisted on by 
the French, was held frivolous by 
the English, when they recollected 
how well the French themselyes had 
behaved, in the campaign of 1792, 
notwithstanding that they were in 
[103 
the same predicament in which they 
represented the English, very few 
of their troops, at that time, having 
everseen actual service. They would 
not surely have the vanity to think, 
the English their inferiors in bodily 
strength and activity, nor possessed 
of fess aptitude to acquire the 
knowledgeof military discipline and 
-tactics. 
But setting these particular con- 
siderations aside, Europe was tho- 
roughly persuaded, that unless France 
could recover a greater degree of 
maritime strength, than thattowhich 
it was now reduced, all its attempts 
to invade this country would either 
be frustrated, or, in the issue of a 
debarkation, terminate in the defeat 
and capture of those troops that 
might venture to land, either fa- 
voured by the casualties of weather, 
or by the absence of those numerous 
shipsof war that guarded the British 
coast, but of which the vigilance 
could not, in the nature of things, 
extend to every accessible part. 
These landings, in the mean time, 
could only succeed through stealth ; 
the moment they were effected, 
the ships of war and transports, 
must, of necessity, make off with 
the utmost precipitation, lest they 
should be discovered and captured ; 
a fate which they would hardly 
ever escape. Thus cut off from 
communication, and supplies, their 
troops, ashore, could not fail to un- 
dergo a similar destiny, : 
It was, therefore, with great rea- 
son, that the public, in Great Bri- 
tain, testified their exultation at the 
triumphs obtained by the British 
navy, and expressed their contempt 
for the endeavours of the French 
to lessen their importance, and to 
magnify their own capacity, to exe- 
cute their designs against this coun- 
[H 4] try, 
