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HISTORY OF, EUROPE. 
’ 
is really entitled to be regarded as 
a sine gua non; that it is an object 
for which this country ought to con- 
tinue the war till it.has expended 
another hundred millions, and shed 
the blood of half a. million more 
wretched beings: if the house think 
80, it ought openly to declare its 
opinion. If, on the contrary, the 
house shall think with me, that it is 
not worth the risk of this country, 
to expend such immense treasures 
of money and blood,,in order to, re- 
store it to the emperor, who, after 
all, may, perhaps, in a short time, 
be no ;longer our ally: then, let 
them actlikemen, and, by some fair 
and unequivocal amendment, con- 
vince the country, and shew the 
world, that they will not be longer 
subservient to such a dreadful waste 
of blood and treasure. But if it -be 
true that the negociation was bro- 
ken off, on the sround that the re- 
tention of Belgium was made a sine 
qua non, on the one part, and its re- 
storation to. the emperor.a sine qua 
mon, on the other; I ask on: what 
ground was this done? Was the 
emperor a patty to the negocia- 
tion ? Here then isa sine gua non 
made in a matter intended sciely 
‘for the benefit of the emperor, to 
which, nevertheless, he is not a par- 
ty, and which we do not know 
whether he himself would absolute- 
ly. insist on or not! Surely. this 
might have been known before the 
Negociation was .entered upon. 
When we were so often sending, 
_snch. immense sams to. the em- 
eror, millions. after millions, some 
person or other, employed in those 
offices, might have asked the ques- 
tioned. Had any one done so? No. 
Task any impartial man, if this is 
‘not a mere mockery? But, says 
the : tight honourable gentleman, 
[1s7 
with great emphasis, why did not 
the directory present a contre projet? 
To whom should. they present it ? 
was the emperor a party? No. 
They had, then, no one to preseat 
it to, for, eveyy thing contained in 
our projet was for the emperor's 
benefit alone. 1 agree with the 
right honourable gentleman as to 
the principle, that a people who 
come into the power. of another 
people, by.the chance of war, can- 
not, by the law of nations, be dis- 
posed of lawfully till the definitive 
treaty of peace is concluded; ‘but 
this is very different from a people 
who are left at liberty to chuse a 
government’ for themselves, and 
who, after such liberty, voluntarily 
adopt the step of uniting themselves 
with their neighbours ; and those, 
who, perhaps, at one time, might 
have claimed oyer them the right 
of conquest. , The French, Mr. Fox 
observed, were now, and always had 
been represented by. ministers, as a 
hordeof assassins, Suppose the Corsi- 
cans had chosen the king of Great 
Britain for their king, and intreated, 
in thestrongest terms, that theymight 
not be given up'to those assassins, 
would it be said by the British mi- 
nister, inanegociation for peace; that 
Corsica was an object of restora- 
tion? Mr. Fox believed that it 
would not; and might not the 
French use the same arguments re- 
specting Belgium? On former oc- 
casions, when the conquests in the 
West Indies were mentioned,» as 
means of negociation, the idea of 
the status quo ante bellum was turns 
ed into ridicule. Martinico, par- 
ticularly, (though -in this negocia- 
tion the minister had lowered: his 
tone) was, on those occasions, not 
to be considered as a coneuest in 
former wars; but’ as territory re- 
ceived 
