SaraAr EE. 2 A PBR SS. 
difpofition and principles of the 
common enemy. On his fide, we 
are told that there was a ftudied ac- 
cumulation of every thing that 
could offend and irritate a high- 
minded people, fuch as the people 
-of England once was;—a wanton 
violation of ail the mutually re- 
{peétful forms which long ufage has 
eftablifhed in the intércourfe of free 
nations;—and a final demand (to 
which, from the moment of our 
firft pacific overtures, that arrogant 
power has conftantly recurred) of a 
dire& furrender of our independ- 
ence, by taking his laws and trea- 
ties for the batis of negotiations, 
and indeed for a preliminary to all 
difcuffion. On our fide, it is avow- 
ed that there was a departure from 
all the rules of common prudence, 
by difclofing all our objects before 
we could learn any one definitive 
pretenfion of the enemy, as the 
price of peace; and a patience 
that, it is too much to be feared, 
France, Europe, and the world, to 
which it is declared, may miftake 
for pufillanimity. The circumftanc- 
es which could warrant fuch a con- 
duct, fo contrary to ali common po- 
licy, ought indeed to be weighty 
and grave, if not imperious and ir- 
refiftible, under our prefent circum- 
ftances, to take any ftep which may 
feem, however diftantly, to approve 
that condué, can only tend. to de- 
«cive his Majefty’s minifters as to 
the fentiments of this Houfe, and 
induce ftill greater humiliation, 
which muft terminate in ruin as 
well as in difhonour. No country 
ean be fafe which is not refpeét- 
ed; no country can hope to be 
refpected that does not firft refpe& 
itfelf. 
2dly. Becaufe, having recorded 
my fentiments on the Journals of 
ahis Houfe when this train of mea- 
23% 
fures was new, and the refult of the 
firft experiment yet in fufpenfe, I 
have now the affliction of finding, 
that whatever I had apprehended 
from it has been very much exceed- 
ed by its effects, in raifing the in- 
folence and audacity of the enemy, 
and in breaking down that {pirit 
and energy of government which 
can alone work out our fafety in 
this awful juncture, or give dignity 
and glory to our fall. 
3dly. Becaufe the facrifices which 
his Majefty has lately been advifed 
to offer, and ftill to declare himfelf 
ready to make, cannot now have 
the fame object which the fame, or 
fimilar offers, had on a former occa- 
fion. We were then anxious, by 
the ceflion of our own acquifitions, 
to redeem the moft important part 
of the ancient eftablifhed fyftem 
of Europe, in which a breach had 
been made, and which was menaced 
with ftill greater danger. In diffe- 
rent treaties of peace, fometimes 
England, fometimes France, fome- 
times other ftates, according to the 
circumftances of the junéture, have 
furrendered more or lefs of their ac- 
tual conquetts for the purpofe of re- 
{toring the general balance of pow- 
er, for the general fafety. In fuch 
a peace we fhould have had fome 
apparent fecurity, though flender 
indeed, againft the ambition and 
rinciples of Republican France. 
But our laft propofed facrifices were 
offered merely to obtain peace. 
For that, and for that alone, we 
were prepared to give up poffef- 
fions which, under the laws of war, 
had become our own, whilft the 
enemy had invariably infitted on 
keeping almoft every thing which 
his arms had conquered from the 
other great powers of Europe. 
Every thing that may be neceflary 
to give rational fecurity to an ene- 
my, 
