232 
my fhewing a true pacific difpofi- 
tion, would be well furrendered 
without any compenfation; but a 
propofal to purchafe peace, as a 
valuable confideration in itfelf, is a 
diftin® admiffion of inferiority, or 
a proof of pufillanimity, never ho- 
nourable, and therefore never fafe 
to a great nation, efpecially in the 
face of an enemy who meafures all 
right by power and audacity; and 
againft whom, it was admitted in 
debate by his Majefty’s minifters, 
¢ That no fecurity could be found 
in peace, without uncommon cau- 
tion, and an uncommon degree of 
warlike preparation.” A treaty 
formed on fuch a principle may be 
complimented with “the name of 
peace, but it will be in effed only a 
fufpenfion of aétive hoftility, with- 
out any of the advantages of: peace, 
and fubject to all the expences and 
dangers of war. seh Tae: 
4thly. Becaufe the whole con- 
duét, as well as-declarations of the 
enemy, fince the opening of the laft 
teflion, had been particularly point- 
ed againft this country, fo as to 
leave no rational ground of expect- 
ing any event from negotiation but 
that which has followed, ef unavail- 
ing humiliation, ©The original trea- 
ty of France with America was moft 
unjuftly infringed, and avowedly 
becanfe the latter country would 
not infift on our granting nominally 
to her, but really to France, excep- 
tionsandimmunities derogated from 
the general maritime law refpeting 
neutral nations, while-ne cne word 
of conciliation was ever ufed to- 
wardsus. Our ally the Empetor was 
by turns menaced and carefled, to 
induce him to liften to a feparate 
peace: And in the very outfet of 
our late negotiation, his Majefty has 
declared that “ Modes were infift- 
4 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 179, 
ed upon, the moft inconfiftent with 
the enemy’s own conduét in every 
other inftance.”” What has never 
yet been demanded by that infolent 
government from any other great 
ftate of Europe, was exacted from 
us, that we fhould become acceffa- 
riés in violating all the ancient 
ufages, invented and received ta 
guard the independency and digni- 
ty even of the weakeft powers. 
No tolerably fecure aiid honoura- 
ble peace could have come, or ever 
can come, from a negotiation com- 
menced and continued in that fpi- 
rit. bias 
5thly. Becaufe, while his Majef- 
ty perfifted ina difpofition to treat, 
and when he again offered in his 
public declaration to ratify the 
terms before propofed by him, the 
whole ground had failed on which 
alone his Majefty had been induced, 
on the 8th ef December, 1793, to 
declare,’ for the firft time, a defire 
of meeting any difpofition which 
the enemy ‘might manifeft to nego- 
tiate a general peace on juft and 
fuitable terms. That ground, as it 
was previoufly explained to us by 
his Majetty’s {peech on the open- 
ing of that feffion; and as all his 
Maiefty’s minifters conftantly ar- 
gued in debate, was the eftablifh- 
ment in France “ of an order of 
things compatible with the tran- 
quillity “of other countries, and af- 
fording a reafonable expe¢tation of 
fecurity and permanence in any 
treaty which might be concluded.” 
Siich-an order'of things was bene- 
velently hoped by his Majefty to 
have been eftablifhed in the third 
new conftitution made in the fourth 
year -of the French Republic. In 
the interim between our two ne- 
gotiations at Paris arid at Lifle, the 
firft eleGtion, ‘not immediately con- 
pacgle ses “+ trouled 
