| whose. intentions’ were evidently, 
| inimical... They openly at length 
iefused to pay taxes, or to acknow- 
| ledge the, viceroy’s authority ;, they 
seized his, person in a progress he 
was making through theisiand, and 
released him only on condition he 
should recall the troops he had sta- 
i tioned in the interior parts. The 
4) malcontents continued their. intri- 
uw, gues, and completely succeeded in 
‘filling the public with complaints 
and dissatisfaction. Apprised of 
their designs, the viceroy perceiving 
them, intimated the intention of 
leaving the island, and embarking 
with the English garrison... In con- 
of French and Corsicans sailed from 
_ Leghorn, and landed on the. eigh- 
multitudes having joined them, they 
“proceeded to Bastia, the capital, 
_and summoned the English garrison 
to surrender; but it effected. its 
sembarkation on board the ships in 
_the harbour with inconsiderable 
loss, and withdrew to Porto Ferraio, 
in the island of Elbe, of which the 
English had taken possession at the 
. time that Leghorn was seized by the 
1 _ French, in order to prevent them 
| from making a seizure of this island 
in the same manner. 
The evacuation of Corsica by 
.|. the English, and its return to the 
government of Trance, was an 
) event peculiarly acceptable. to the 
_ directory, which did not fail to 
Speak of it in terms of the greatest 
satisfaction, and to magnify it as 
of the highest importance to the 
‘Tepublic, and detriment to the Eng- 
Jish interest in the Mediterranean. 
_ The fact was, that the retention of 
it would manifestly have cost much 
_ more than its worth. The disposi- 
y! ‘ 
| oo- HISTORY OF EUROPE, © 
[115, 
tion of the inhabitants was.so little 
to be relied upon, and they had 
been so thoroughly prejudiced’’a- 
gainst the British government, that 
it appeared totally useless to endea- 
vour to reclaim them by reasonings, 
which they would have disregarded, 
or to coerce them, by severities, 
which would have produced civil 
contentions. and bloodshed, | that 
must have filled the island with 
wretchedness and calamity, without 
answering: any ether purpose than 
perpetuating mutual enmity, and 
rendering the possession of it.@ 
source of endless perpiexity. In 
this light, the determination taken 
to abandon it, was a measure of 
timely prudence. 
These various successes of the 
French, and of their partisans, ac- 
celerated the treaties of peace into 
which the princes of ltaly had en- 
gaged to enter with the republic. 
The king of Naples and the duke 
of Parma had, conformably to the 
terms of the armistice granted to 
them, deputed commissioners to 
Paris, to settle the conditions. It 
was 2n auspicious circumstance “for 
both, that Spain was at this time 
on friendly terms with France. 
Under the mediation of the Spanish 
minister at Paris, these two prin- 
ces were treated by the direétory 
with more moderation than they 
could have otherwise expected, 
considering the inveteracy they bad 
manifested against the republic ; 
much the same conditions were 
granted to them, as to the other 
powers with which France had 
already concluded pacifications. 
Naples however was required to 
pay the sum of eight millions, either 
in money or in naval storess The 
Batavian republic was formally in- 
ier this treaty, whigh was 
{l2 
