treat at last upon afooting of equa- 
lity with that one, which, while it 
remained unyanquished, would al- 
ways prove an effectual obstacle to 
that plan of universal influence over 
all the governmenis of Europe, 
which France had, since the unex- 
pected success of its arms, kept con- 
stantly in view. : 
_ However the French might exult 
in the triumphant career of their 
armies, it plainly appeared, by the 
sentiments repeatedly expressed by 
the principal speakers of the conven- 
tion, and in the councils, and upon 
aj] public occasions, to be their inti- 
mate persuasion, however averse. to 
avow it, that while England stood 
its ground, they would never totally 
accomplish those mighty schemes of 
conquest and influence. To exe- 
cute them partially, would only in- 
volve them in perpetual quarrels 
with those powers whose interest 
required their depression, and whose 
cause England would never fail to 
support. ‘Thus it was clear, that 
unless the strength of this ancient 
rival were effectually broken, and it 
were reduced to sue for peace on 
such terms as France should diétate, 
the proposed effeét of so many vic- 
tories would be frustrated, as the 
humiliation of all'its other enemies 
would not secure to the republic 
those objeéts at which it avowedly 
aimed. The prolongation of the 
war, in order to attain these, might 
be attended with such vicissitudes 
of fortune, as would entirely change 
the circumstances of affairs, and 
oblige the republic, in its turn, to 
abate of its high pretensions, and 
even to compound for its existence, 
and the preservation of the ancient 
limits ef France. 
That these ideas frequently oc- 
curred to the most sagacious of the 
7 
HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
[165 
French, is incontestible, from the 
various publications of the time, 
and no less from that remarkable 
anxiety with which their rulers 
canvassed every subjeét relating to 
England. Howto compass its de- 
pression was the chief object of their 
councils ; and every fortunate event 
that befel them, in their numerous 
enterprizes, employed their consi- 
deration in what manner to convert 
it to the detriment of England. 
. Among the various means of ob- 
taining that important end, the an- 
noyance of the English maritime 
commerce had long been tried, cer- 
tainly not without some degree of 
success: but in no degree sufficient 
to weaken the naval power of Eng- 
land, which continued to rule the 
seas in every quarter of the globe, 
with irresistible sway. It was in- 
deed from this very circumstance, 
that France derived a multiplicity 
of arguments in its manifestos and 
exhortations, both to its own people, 
and to the other nations of Europe. 
Their tendency was to prove, that 
England was the tyrant of the sea, 
and that all the European powers 
were interested in repressing that 
tyranny. To effeét this, they ought 
to unite cordially with France, and 
second its endeavours to restore the 
freedom of the seas, by abridging, 
through every means in their power, 
the commercial resources of Eng- 
land. The actual strength of its 
navy was so great, that it could not 
at present be opposed with much 
hope of success :» but other methods 
might be used, not less effeétual in 
their ultimate issue, and these were 
in the option of every state. That 
the power which commanded the 
seas, commanded also the shores, 
and that naval power was of more 
importance than dominion at land, 
{M 3] had 
