166} 
had passed into a kind of political 
maxim for ages. It was, in fact, 
a superiority of naval power that 
subverted the Roman empire. The 
irruptions of the Gauls, the Cimbri, 
and Teutones, by land, were re- 
pelled, and might have been re- 
pelled had they been repeated. 
The necessity of subsistence drove 
them quickly to the necessity of 
committing their fortune to the issue 
of 2 battle, in which the invaded 
derived an advantage over the in- 
vaders from the possession, and from 
the knowledge of the country. But 
when the barbarians began to com- 
bine their military operations with 
naval expeditions ; when stores, as 
well as troops, were poured upon 
the Roman frontier, from the Baltic, 
the Dwina, the Elbe, the Danube, 
and the Euxine seas, then, and not 
till then, they began to be wholly 
irresistible. It was the maritime 
habits, and the naval power of the 
Scandinavians, under the appella- 
tion of Normans, Danes, Picks, and 
other names, that enabled them, for 
the space of six hundred years, to 
harrass, over-run, and rule the 
greater part of the sea-coasts of Eu- 
rope. The trade ofa pirate became 
an honourable profession. The sons 
of kings, at the head of pirates, 
sought and obtained at once settle- 
ments and renown. Since the re- 
vival of letters, the modern im- 
provements in arts and sciences, and 
the vast extension of commerce, the 
superior importance of naval power 
seemed to be farther illustrated, and 
more certainly established. 
It was not among the least strik- 
ing instances of that fertility of 
imagination which supported the 
French under all difficulties, that 
they found means, as they con- 
ceived, to oppose power at land to 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1796. 
power at sea: fo raise the naval 
power of France, and to under-— 
mine that of England, by exclud- 
ing her trade from the great inlets 
of Europe. This would give Eng- 
land a blow from which it would 
not easily recover. It could not 
fail to produce an immediate altera- 
tion inits commercial circumstances; 
the depression ef which would in- 
fallibly create a discouragement — 
and despondency in the English go- 
vernment, that must induce it, at 
once, to remit of the haughtiness 
with which it exercised its naval 
superiority over other nations. 
Such was the purport of the va- 
rious publications issued by autho-~ 
rity, or proceeding from the many 
individuals, who busied themselves 
with compositions of this nature. }} 
The impression which they made 
upon the generality of European 
states, was very feeble. None, in- 
deed, appeared to pay them much 
attention, but those on which France 
possessed the forcible means of in- 
fluence. The others were con- 
vinced, that the motives of the 
French, in those warm addresses to 
the continental powers, were dic- 
tated by selfish views, and that, 
were they to succeed in overthrow 
ing the maritime power of England, 
they would doubtless transfer it to 
themselves, and employ. it to the 
same ends to which they had so no- 
toriously converted the superiority 
they had acquired at land. 
It was doubtless inconsistent, on 
the ground of morality in the Eng- 
lish nation, to arraign the am- 
bition and tyranny of the French, 
while they themselves, pursued 
schemes of tyranny and ambition 
on the main ocean, und in every 
quarter of the globe. If the French 
were plunderers at land, the Eng- 
lish 
