C2] ANNUAL REGISTER, 1800. 



in the British constitution, went 

 before a measure, and if he could 

 prevent any bill from coming into 

 parliament, he would be an absolute 

 monarch. " If tliis opinion be 

 just, what must be the importance 

 of the preliminary negative of the 

 executive power in the new French 

 constitution? That scheme reduces 

 tlie influence of the people on those 

 who are styled their representatives, 

 almost to nothing. Not only hav.e 

 the legislators, no sympathies, no 

 connections with the people: they 

 have not the power, if they were 

 the immediate repi'esentatives of 

 the nation, to adopt a single law 

 for promoting tlieir advantage, or 

 remedying their grievances. The 

 executive power alone is to feel, to 

 think, to suggest. Every measure 

 of public liberty, and of national 

 utility, must originate with that 

 authority whose designs every wise 

 legislator has contemplated with 

 incessant jealousy, whose wisdom he 

 lias ever thought it necessary to. 

 support by authoritative counsel, 

 whose misconduct and iiicapacity 

 lie has thought it indispensable to 

 correct by senatorial advice, and by 

 legislative control. There was no 

 contrivance by which the repre- 

 sentatives could draw support from 

 tlie people, even if there did exist 

 between them a community of in- 

 terests and sentiment: nothing by 

 which the people might be aided 

 through the representative body. 

 There was no pi'ovision for tlie 

 liberty of the press, none to enable 

 the people to meet and consider the 

 measures of government. While 

 the principal members of adniinis- 

 ti'ation were relieved from all re- 

 spnnsil;ility, the ministers were not 

 to be liable to impeachment, until 

 the validitv of the char";es of anv 



illegal acts or warrants signed by 

 them, sliould first be recognized by 

 the senate, and all of them then 

 admitted by the legislative body. 

 The influence of the executive with 

 the legislative powers must always 

 be sufficient to procure impunity 

 to its instruments. In truth, it was 

 said, there Vv^as nothing in this go- 

 vernment but a magistracy invested 

 with unlimited power. The rest 

 of the appendages were calculated 

 for its convenience, and not given 

 for the purpose of independent and 

 liberal assistance, or if necessary, 

 of adequate control. The chief 

 magistrate was, indeed, a king, 

 invested with royal prerogatives. 

 He was the fountain of honour and 

 emolument. He was the source 

 from which every favour must be 

 expected. He was the instrumenu 

 to punish or protect. His satellite 

 councils, wliatever fantastical ap- 

 pellations they might assume, were 

 nothing: they gave neither light 

 nor heat in the system ; they nei- 

 ther warmed nor beautified. They 

 begot no love; they dispensed no 

 favours ; they inspired no confl- 

 dence; they attracted no admira- 

 tion. They were the source of 

 nothing liberal,nothing muniflcent, 

 nothing beneficial. They did not 

 emanate from the people ; they did 

 not belong to the nation; they 

 could not iix its hopes, or be the 

 depositaries of its wishes. They 

 acted only by the sufierance of the 

 king. 



On the other hand, on this sub- 

 ject which was so interesting to all 

 Euro])e, it was said, "that any con- 

 stitution that possessed in itself the 

 power of repressing anarchy, com- 

 posing the agitated mass, and re- 

 taining men in society, was pre- 

 ferable to that stale of discord and 



