HISTORY OF EUROPE. [79 



sions, with respect to the lives of his 

 remaining soldiers, after his flight, 

 and his directions to general Kleber, 

 to propose preliminaries of peace to 

 the Porte ; to enter into a treaty of 

 peace, and to defer the execution 

 of the articles ? ' You may, (says he, 

 in his official letter) sign a treaty to 

 evacuate Egypt; but do not execute 

 the articles, as you may observe, 

 with great plausibility, that it must 

 be sent home in order to be sub- 

 mitted to the inspection and rati- 

 fication of the directory.' — Thus, 

 ray lords, we are in complete pos- 

 session of his system of politics, a 

 systemas fraudulent, perfidious, and 

 destructive as ever was practised, to 

 the disgrace and misery of human 

 nature. Thus are we provided with 

 unquestionable pledges of his future 

 integrity. In the correspondence 

 which appears upon your table, his 

 motives are open and undisguised ; 

 and there is not the least necessity 

 for having recourse to conjecture 

 to ascertain that he has a double 

 object in his communication. The 

 one is to amuse Great Britain, and 

 the other to induce her to give 

 offijnce to her allies. I hope I shall 

 not be accused of entertaining any 

 unfounded jealousy of such a man, 

 who, having done nothing to re- 

 deem his good faith, so often vio- 

 lated, but the overturning the go- 

 vernment of his country by the 

 terror of military despotism, now 

 comes forward with proposals of 

 pacification. When we are fully 

 satisfied with the share which he 

 has had in previous aggressions and 

 depredations, can we be too slow in 

 giving him credit for professions of 

 sincerity." 



Lord Grenville had heard it re- 

 ported as a matter of opinion, that 

 it was the peculiar interest of the 

 first consul to make peace. He was 



convinced that it might be the in- 

 terest of general Buonaparte to 

 consolidate his power ; but it could 

 not be forgotten, that whenever 

 any acts of atrocity were to be 

 committed by the French,*they had 

 been usually effected by a suspen- 

 sion of arms. Tlie proposed nego- 

 ciation would relieve France from 

 the present pressure of numerous 

 and alarming difficulties, and could 

 not relieve England from any. 

 The ports of France, now block- 

 aded by our fleets and cruisers, 

 would be thrown open, for the 

 purpose of introducing naval stores: 

 fleets too would be sent to bring 

 back the troops which were now 

 deprived of all intercourse with 

 the republic. — From a negociation 

 Buonaparte would derive consider- 

 able advantages to the commerce 

 and manufactures of the republic, 

 whilst this country, with respect to 

 any benefit, would be left merely in 

 its present situation. He would also 

 enjoy the satisfaction and the tri- 

 umph of lowering the tone and the 

 character of a people who had Iii- 

 therto proved the great and the ef- 

 fectual barrier against the encroach- 

 ments of republican policy, and in- 

 fuse into our allies, and the other 

 powers, a distrust of our resolution 

 and integrity. — His lordship obser- 

 ved, that, in turbulent republics, it 

 had ever been an axiom to preserve 

 tranquillity by constant action; this 

 axiom had uniformly been the stand- 

 ard by which the system of the poli- 

 tics of France had been regulated. 

 Buonaparte had made strong pro- 

 fessions of a desire of peace, and he 

 had said that the present overture 

 was the second proof of his wish to 

 effectuate a general pacification. 

 But lord Grenville was at a loss to 

 find any proof of his having enter- 

 tained such a desire. Did he allude 



