HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



[81 



Buonaparte? He could not, in terms 

 sufficiently strong, censure that lit- 

 tleness of mind which prompted his 

 majesty 's ministers to attack the cha- 

 racter of Buonaparte, with a view 

 to ruin him in the esteem of the 

 French nation ; as if, by doing so, 

 they would be able to negociate 

 with more eifect, or gain a fairer 

 prospect of peace. — His grace ad- 

 mitted that there might be occasions 

 when it might be necessary to de- 

 cline the negociation : but no such 

 occasion existed at the present mo- 

 ment. He referred to former de- 

 clarations of the noble secretary, 

 wherein he had stated that his ma- 

 jesty would never suffer the enemies 

 of the country to possess that advan- 

 tage which they necessarily mu st de- 

 rive from his refusal to discuss their 

 overtures for peace. In fact, every 

 thing he had advanced, as reasons 

 for entering into the former nego- 

 ciation, was at variance with what 

 he had said to-night. It had, in the 

 note to Barthelemy, been asserted 

 that England would always be wil- 

 ling to treat, when its enemies shew- 

 ed a disposition to that effect. — If 

 this disposition was not a mockery, 

 why die! it not treat now ? France 

 had shewn a pacific disposition, and 

 the only way to ascertain whether 

 she was sincere, and whether Buo- 

 naparte was willing to do these acts, 

 by which he could guarantee the 

 security of this country, was to en- 

 ter into a negociation. To deter- 

 mine to persist in the war after the 

 concessions on the part of the French 

 government, was neither open, man- 

 ly, nor characteristic of the British 

 nation. He next referred to the 

 report of Boulay de la Meurthe, 

 relative to the government and situ- 

 ation of France and its rulers for 

 the last seven years, and admittted. 

 Vol. XLII. 



that what was said by Boulay de la 

 Meurthe was the same as proceed- 

 ing from Buonaparte: but his re- 

 port was no more to be used by the 

 people of this country as an argu- 

 ment against the lately abolished 

 constitution of France, than a report 

 of any violent jacobin upon the an- 

 cient government of Louis XVI. 

 He referred also to the reports of 

 Monge, upon presenting the treaty 

 of Campo Formio to the directory ; 

 and maintained, that his declaration 

 in that report was far from complete 

 evidence; that it was the general 

 opinion of the French nation that 

 England and France could not exist 

 together. With regard to the cha- 

 racter of Buonaparte, he did not see 

 any use that could be drawn from 

 going into it. He, like all states- 

 men, no doubt, wished to make a 

 peace, advantageous to himself, and 

 the nation over which he presided. 

 Like all other statesmen, his mo- 

 tives in wishing to make a peace 

 were not influenced by humanity; 

 it was to be supposed that he would 

 not make any peace, but such an 

 one as would satisfy the French 

 nation. He believed him sincere, 

 because France wished for peace, 

 and peace alone could consolidate 

 his power. The events of war 

 were uncertain; and whenever a 

 leader failed, and was deserted by 

 fortune, the people deserted him 

 likewise. If Buonaparte should 

 experience reverses, he would, no 

 doubt, be destroyed, and some 

 other idol substituted. It was for 

 their lordships to consider, whether 

 they would continue the war for the 

 purpose of establishing some other 

 person in the room of Buonaparte. 

 As to the abuse which ministers 

 had thrown upon the character of 

 that man, he felt no concern upon 



