HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



[83 



impossible to guess how long he 

 might remain there ; and conse- 

 quently equally impossible to feel 

 any security with respect to his 

 power of observing any treaty that 

 might be concluded with him. — He 

 might be succeeded in the govern- 

 ment by the jacobin faction, whose 

 old cry of war, eternal war with 

 England, would, no doubt, lead 

 them to put an end to any treaty 

 which might be depending be- 

 tween the two countries : when 

 we should be entirely at the mer- 

 cy of France. He could not pre- 

 tend to determine what might be 

 the real dispositions of the first 

 consul, relative to general pacifica- 

 tion. It was, however, not a little 

 remarkable, that though, in the 

 first note transmitted, by the secre- 

 tary of state, to France, his majesty 

 expressly stated his intentions of 

 acting only in concert with his 

 allies, not one word should be said, 

 in the second French note, respect- 

 ing peace with the allies. We 

 were expressly invited to Dunkirk, 

 for the purpose of concluding peace 

 between England and France ; and 

 no reference whatever was made 

 to any of those allies, in concert 

 with whom, alone, his majesty had 

 so properly declared his intention 

 of acting. He argued, therefore, 

 that even if we had acceded to 

 the French propositions, it washlgh- 

 ly probable that we might have 

 left in existence the continental 

 war : we might have enabled 

 France, in a certain degree, to 

 have recruited her forces ; and to 

 bring her forces so recruited, against 

 our allies. We might have left 

 alive the military habits, spirits, 

 and occupations, of that military 

 nation : we might have prepared 

 for Buonaparte's successors, (for he 



would not, as the noble secretarj' 

 had, at least, imprudently done, 

 suppose that general to be a faith- 

 less observer of treaties) a power 

 more formidable than that now 

 enjoyed by Buonaparte himself; 

 more formidable from its intrinsic 

 strength ; more formidable from the 

 views and principles of those who 

 might be intrusted with the di- 

 rection of it, but above all, more 

 formidable, from the depressed and 

 abject state in which it would, 

 most assuredly, under such circum- 

 stances, find this country. 



The duke of Bedford had said, 

 that the first note, transmitted by 

 the secretary of state to France, 

 was not one that was likely to 

 induce Buonaparte to acknowledge 

 the original aggression of France, 

 or to disclaim those principles which 

 had contributed so much to the 

 commencement and continuance of 

 the war. But, in a paragraph in 

 lord Grenville's letter, it had been 

 stated, that no advantage could 

 arise from negociation until it 

 should distinctly appear, that the 

 principles, which Originally pro- 

 duced the war, had ceased to ope- 

 rate. If Buonaparte was really 

 sincere in his professions (for lord 

 Borringdon, in the course and anima- 

 tion of speaking, was seduced from 

 his determination to say nothing of 

 Buonaparte's sincerity or insinceri- 

 ty) — if Buonaparte was sincere in 

 his professions of peace, this would 

 naturally have induced him, if not 

 to make any new professions of 

 principles, at least, to confirm those 

 which he had already made, on the 

 eve of his revolution, by his organ, 

 Boulay de la Meurthe. But Talley- 

 rand, in his second note, is taaie, 

 in a great degree, to justify all 

 the excesses of the former go- 



