H I S T O R Y O F EUROPE. [85 



»ot like to listen to, or to make 

 overtures : that is, that it was our 

 animosity that precluded a nego- 

 ciation for peace. One of the 

 principal objections now urged, to 

 any negociation with France, was 

 the recency of the late revolu- 

 tion. On former occasions, minis- 

 ters themselves had not considered 

 such a circumstance as affording 

 any objection against negociation, as 

 of itself it could be none. It was 

 said, that Buonaparte might be 

 ijisincere. There were no good 

 grounds for supposing that the 

 French government was insincere : 

 on the contrary, every day tended 

 to demonstrate its sincerity. Was 

 it reasonable to suppose that Buo- 

 naparte should admit that the guilt 

 of the original aggression lay with 

 France ? The noble secretary him- 

 self, in an official correspondence, 

 during a former negociation, had 

 expressly stated that there was no 

 r-eason to go into the question, who 

 was right or wrong in a preceding 

 negociation. The object was, to 

 negociate on the actual circum- 

 stances of relative situation, and on 

 the real grounds in dispute. It was 

 not Talleyrand who began this con- 

 test about the original aggression. 

 He merely stated, that the original 

 aggression was not the question. 

 Suppose that Buonaparte, desirous 

 to obtain peace by every means, 

 should sit down to consider how he 

 would succeed in the object of his 

 wishes, what does lord Grenville's 

 note allow him to do ? He would 

 find, indeed, that the restoration o( 

 the hereditary line of kings was the 

 only case in which a speedy peace 

 was admitted to be possible. His 

 own government must Ije proved, 

 by cxj^>crience and the evidence of 



facts, before it was admitted to ne- 

 gociate. But what was this expe- 

 rience and the evidence of facts ? 

 Formerly six weeks were deemed 

 sufficient. Now the probation re- 

 quired was neither ascertained by 

 its direction, nor by the mode in 

 which it was to be conducted. 

 Unfortunately it was too true, that 

 the example of this country might 

 give to France an apology for 

 some part of her violence. What 

 had been our conduct to neutral 

 powers ? Had not we violated the 

 neutrality of the grand duke of 

 Tuscany, in spite of the most solemn 

 treaties .'' Had we not violated the 

 neutrality of Genoa ? What was 

 the conduct of our allies ? Did not 

 the Russians violate the neutrality 

 of other states ? Did it not prescribe 

 to the king of Denmark that no 

 clubs should be permitted in his 

 dominions ? The noble secretary, 

 in j ustifying the conduct of ministers 

 in rejecting all negociation, drew 

 many of his arguments from the se- 

 cond letter of Talleyrand. But no- 

 thing in that note could be the least 

 palliation of the refusal to negoci- 

 ate ; because the decision of minis- 

 ters was pronounced, before they 

 would know or suspect thatasecond 

 messenger would be received. It 

 was objected, that the French had 

 said nothing of a general peace, to 

 which alone we could agree. The 

 letter of the chief consul however, 

 to his majesty, alluded to the mise- 

 ries of war every where, and ex- 

 pressed a desire, every where (in 

 fair construction) to put an end to 

 them. At any rate, we might have 

 suggested the propriety of an ex- 

 plicit avowal. The noble secre- 

 tary had enumerated the evils that 

 would arise from negociation. But 



