204] ANNUAL REGISTER, 1800. 



operation. On the whole^ general 

 Moreau being now without any 

 alarm for the army of reserve, or 

 any restraint imposed upon his ope- 

 rations, by a concern for its preser- 

 vation, but,on the contrary,strength- 

 ened by its co-operation on the side 

 of the Grisons and the Tyrolese, 

 was now at liberty to unfold theen- 

 terprize of his character, after a 

 display of the most consummate 

 prudence. He prepared to cross the 

 Danube, and, if possible, to bring 

 general Kray to a decisive action. 

 For this last purpose, on the eigh- 

 teenth of June, he sent the risrht 

 wmg of his army, under Lecourbe, 

 over tlie river below Ulm, between 

 Dillingen and the celebrated village 

 of Blenheim: by this movement, 

 threatening to cut off general Kray 

 from his magazines at Donawert 

 and Ratisbon, as well as from his 

 expected reinforcements . The 

 main body crossed at a point nearer 

 to Ulm. 



The motives or views of general 

 Moreau, in this step, he explains 

 in a letter addressed to the chief 

 consul, bearing date the twenty- 

 second of June: "He had observed," 

 he says, " that the Austrian army 

 kept close to its camp at Ulm,which 

 gave it the advantage of easy open- 

 ings on both sides of the Danube, 

 while it consequently prevented the 

 French from making any consider- 

 able progress in Germany. Gene- 

 ral Moreau had made a movement, 

 in order to induce the enemy to 

 give battle near Blaubeuven, which 

 he declined. Fearing that general 

 Kray might avail himself of that 

 movement, in order to advance 

 upon Memmingen, connect himself 

 with the Tyrol, and send down a 

 corps of troops into Italy, that might 

 have very much embarrassed the 



chief consul, he determined to mate 

 general Lecourbe execute several 

 manoeuvres on the Leek, in the 

 hopes that he should thereby force 

 general Kray to march to protect 

 Bavaria ; but he continued to ma- 

 noeuvre in the French rear. Ima- 

 gining that an opportunity was pre- 

 sented of gaining a considerable 

 advantage, he made an attack on 

 Moreau 's left wing, on the fifth of 

 June, but was so bravely opposed 

 by general Richenpanse and other 

 officers, that he was obliged to re- 

 treat with precipitation, and repass 

 the Danube. General Moreau 

 then formed the project of compell- 

 ing him to withdraw, or come to a 

 battle." 



In the execution of this design, 

 a series of actions took place for 

 four successive days, on the famous 

 plains of Blenheim or Hochstadt; in 

 which the Austrians lost, in killed, 

 wounded, and prisoners, not less 

 than five or six thousand men; and 

 the French, at least, as was com- 

 puted, half that number. The Aus- 

 trian divisions, under the generals 

 Sztarray and Nauendorf, being cut 

 off from the main army, general 

 Kray was reduced to the necessity 

 of leaving Ulm to the protection of 

 a garrison. The blockade of Ulm 

 was now carried on by general 

 Richenpanse. General Kray, after 

 several very severe actions on the 

 left side of the Danube, retreated, 

 with his reduced army, to Ingol- 

 stadt. 



To give a detailed account of all 

 the manoeuvres and actions,through 

 which the French crossed the Rhine, 

 established themselves on the left 

 bank, and drove the main Austrian 

 army from their entrenched camp, 

 near Ulm, would carry us far be- 

 yond our bounds, and would indeed 



