HISTORY OF EUROPE. [225 



find ourselves cast upon a sea of 

 hypothesis, without rudder or com- 

 pass to guide us. We think only 

 through the medium of our senses. 

 We see that an acquaintance with 

 our physical organization is neces- 

 sary to the knowledge of our intel- 

 lectual faculties. We perceive that 

 the impressions made upon our 

 organs, and their accompanying 

 sensations, cannot he considered se- 

 parately from those exterior objects 

 that produce them, and that, in 

 order to our being able to judge 

 how we come to have the notion 

 of sound, of colours, of taste, and 

 so on, we must first know how the 

 air is put into vibration by sonorous 

 bodies, what are the laws of re- 

 flection, and refraction, of what 

 nature are the principles contained 

 in the aliments of which we make 

 use: and thus are we obliged, be- 

 fore we can proceed to any other 

 study, to return to that of our phy- 

 sical organization ; to the study of 

 physical beings, and the acts which 

 concern them. 



Other speculators, of the present 

 day, we mean since the times of the 

 Encyclopaedists, and in the very 

 twilight between the closing and 

 the succeeding century, steering, as 

 it were, a middle course, in the ar- 

 rangement of the arts and sciences, 

 between lord Bacon and his follow- 

 ers, on the one hand, and those 

 whom we shall call the sensation- 

 ists, on the other, observe, that as 

 the mind, whether it be considered 

 as a spiritual and intellectual, or 

 merely as a sentient being, is the 

 mirror in which, by means of ab- 

 stracted ideas, we attempt to survey 

 the external world; so it is, by 

 means of analogies drawn from tlic 

 external world, that we endeavour 

 Vol. XLII. 



to analyse the operations of our 

 minds. As, on the one hand, we 

 examine matter, by metaphysical 

 abstractions, so, on the other, we 

 have no ideas or names for the ope- 

 rations of the mind, than such as 

 are taken from objects of sense. 

 Every thing we perceive or think 

 of seems to be of a mixed nature. 

 It is difficult to say what is mind 

 and what matter, nor is it at all ne- 

 cessary, in the eye of just philoso- 

 phy, that the difference should be 

 ascertained. Yet, according to our 

 conception of things, the difference 

 between mind and matter is suffi- 

 ciently clear. And the most com- 

 prehensive and accurate arrange- 

 ment of all the branches of know- 

 ledge, perhaps, is the following : 



First, mind exercised on matter; 



Secondly, matter; 



Thirdly, mind. 



The first of these classes compre- 

 hends physics, or experimental 

 philosophy, including optics, astro- 

 nomy, hydrostatics, pneumatics, 

 mechanics, magnetism, electricity, 

 and chymistry. 



The second comprehends matters 

 of fact, and hypothetical theories ; 

 the first of these subdivisions, com- 

 prehending the results of particu- 

 lar observations and experiments, 

 whether designed oraccidental; the 

 second, that view of the operations 

 of nature, which is formed by the 

 imagination, according to habitual 

 associations ; which is, indeed, 

 loose, popular, and only analogical ; 

 but which, however, is of use in 

 dividing the labours of philosophy, 

 and employing them in a course of 

 well-directed experiments. This 

 second subdivision of the second 

 class refers principally to physiology, 

 comprising the theory of the earth, 



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