346 | ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 1944 
Persia, and such successes as have been achieved are largely due to 
the efficiency of the machinery which had to translate into action the 
plans prepared by experts. 
The invasion area of the desert locust, however, is not restricted to 
East Africa and the adjoining parts of Asia, but extends across the 
French West and North African territories. Here the organization of 
control is in the hands of French authorities, and the Allied Govern- 
ments are only rendering assistance by supplies of poison. French 
experts and the administration are faced with enormous difficulties 
in organizing their anti-locust campaigns, but their efforts are meeting 
with considerable success. Great progress in the anti-locust organiza- 
tion was marked by the establishment in 1943 of the Office National 
Antiacridien at Algiers. This office, directed by the outstanding locust 
expert, Dr. B. N. Zolotarevsky, aims at coordinating anti-locust meas- 
ures throughout the French African territories. A continuous work- 
ing contact is maintained with the Anti-Locust Research Centre in 
London, and in this way the unity of the general plan is ensured. 
The great series of anti-locust campaigns just outlined is far from 
being over, and it is too early to claim their success. Nevertheless, it 
is significant that, with the invasion in its fourth year, no serious losses 
of crops occurred anywhere, in sharp contrast to what happened in 
the past invasions by the desert locust. Great efforts were needed to 
achieve this result, but their cost must be regarded in relation to the 
losses that appeared unavoidable. It should be clearly understood, 
however, that this success is only a temporary one, and any relaxation 
of effort would lead to a disaster. In fact, the year 1944-45 may see the 
peak of the present invasion which will probably continue for 2 to 3 
years more, and the campaigns will have to go on until the danger is 
overcome. The need for protecting food production in Africa and the 
Middle East was particularly urgent during the war, but it would be 
a poor introduction to the postwar world if a famine were allowed to 
develop on the conclusion of hostilities. 
