COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY 19 
accomplished by men, would be regarded as indications 
of the possession of marvellous genius. In the brutes 
they are regarded as the outcome of “mere instinct,” by 
which is meant an endowment acting blindly and in- 
capable either of philosophic explanation or of modi- 
fication. While the fact seems to be that instincts, as 
they exist, are the result of inherited experiences ac- 
cumulated through considerable periods of time; that 
they may be modified, and are constantly being modi- 
fied by new experiences; that they may be lost or 
replaced; and much more that we have still to learn, 
many of the instincts of animals are so far removed 
from any knowledge or faculty we possess, that they 
are at present inexplicable. But man must learn to 
say “I don’t know” about a great many things still, 
instead of assuming the validity of explanations which 
are not true solutions at all, but mere assumptions. 
And at this point allow me to indicate a danger that 
should make us cautious and modest in attempting to 
explain the behaviour of animals. We infer from our 
fellowman’s behaviour similarity of motive and mental 
processes to our own under like circumstances. We 
find, the more experience we have, that we are often at 
fault as to both. And when we are more free from the 
thraldom of so-called systems and methods in educa- 
tion, we may learn that the activities of the human 
mind can not be reduced in all persons to precisely the 
one plan, like so much clockwork. This may mar 
somewhat the completeness and beauty of our philo- 
sophy of education, but it may also in the end conduce 
to human progress by providing the greater freedom, 
and end in insuring an individuality of character which 
seems to be now rapidly disappearing. Now, if indi- 
vidual men so differ in psychic behaviour, how much 
more is it likely that still greater differences hold for 
the lower animals! An objection may be based, how- 
