COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY 27 
accept. At the same time, much that can not be re- 
garded as wholly reliable may prove suggestive and 
serve as the starting-point of investigations. But there 
is no reason why many points now bearing the character 
of uncertainty and indefiniteness might not be sub- 
mitted to the test of experiment. Doubtless not a few 
supposed facts would vanish into thin air if subjected 
to such examination. However, I must at the same 
time state that a careful perusal of the accounts of the 
experiments of even the most skilful investigators by 
this method, with its clearly defined but artificially 
arranged conditions, has convinced me that such do not 
wholly meet the case. They bear with them the danger 
of fallacy against which one must constantly be on the 
watch. It must always be considered that the great 
question is, not how an animal’s mind may act, valuable 
as that may be, but how it normally does act; that is to 
say, what are the natural psychic processes of the class of 
animals under investigation? The same caution, in 
drawing conclusions, must be observed in the allied 
science of physiology, one in which the conditions can 
be much more accurately regulated. Plainly, it will be 
desirable to keep our facts very sharply apart from our 
explanations. The science of psychology is a very 
youthful one, that of comparative psychology still more 
so; and, at the present stage of the science, any one 
who contributes a single fact will be a real friend to 
their progress. We must endeavour to secure a large 
number of correspondents who will furnish accurate 
accounts of phenomena in this realm, of which they 
have been themselves the observers. We must place 
all material coming at second-hand by itself, not as 
worthless, but as calling for special scrutiny. But so 
long as we have facts only, we have no science; such, 
indeed, are as the wood and stone for the building, and, 
unless worked up into scientific form, may prove an 
