THE LAW' OF HABIT. 29 



here be inapplicable, but that with the preseiit extent of knoioledye 

 they are so • and that until there is acquired a more comprehensive 

 knowledge of the conditions that govern mental phenomena, which 

 light may possibly come through the researches of physiological 

 psychology as to the correlation of psychical and organic processes, 

 these ordinary methods must remain so. The facts of habit are, in 

 the present state of knowledge of the conditions of mental phenomena, 

 explicable by that philosophy alone which refers them all to final 

 causes. These alone shed light upon the varied facts of habit, and in 

 the light that comes from them must these facts be seen and rendered. 

 It will be shown that the effects of habit upon different portions of our 

 nature are marked by the greatest variety, and by apparent confusion 

 and contradictoriness. The known facts of habit are heterogeneous 

 and incongruous. Though occurring in the midst of apparently 

 similar circumstances, they yet refuse to take classification together, 

 or to show themselves resolvable into different manifestations of one 

 and the same law ; in fact refuse to be treated by any of the ordinary 

 methods of science, for the simple reason that amidst their hetero- 

 geneity no homogeneity, other than merely hypothetical, has yet 

 been found. Ther*^ may be, in all probability there is, some quan- 

 tum (which we may designate by x) which further research may 

 reveal, perhaps some modification of nervous organism concomitant 

 alike with all the varied forms of habit, through which their variety 

 may be reduced to unity, and in terms of which it may in all cases, 

 be expressed. The discovery of the value of this x would make the 

 ordinary methods applicable in treatment of the phenomena of habit ; 

 would eliminate from them the appearance they now present of 

 opposition and incongruity, would make, in fact, that apparent con- 

 trariety of manifestation, the naturally to be expected, nay — the 

 surely predictable result. It is maintained, however, that, even if 

 this quantum should be at any time discovered, the ultimate necessity 

 of an appeal to final causes would not be done away with. Explana 

 tion by physical causes, though quite legitimate, does not exclude, 

 nor even render useless, explanation by final causes. The fact would 

 still confront us that x, reacting in its environment, in the midst of 

 circumstances that are in all cases materially similar, presents us with 

 the greatest diversity of results ; and this variety of function must 

 forever remain inexplicable, except as the result of chance (to which 

 to refer it is no real explanation) unless it be I'ecognized as precon- 



