THE LAW OF HABIT. 45 



sibly concerned remains as it is. The object of Induction is to un- 

 ravel the great complexity of nature, to point out in the grand 

 uniformity apparent amidst this complexity the particular uniformi- 

 ties that exist regarding special facts. Bacon himself thought tliat 

 all other methods would be superseded Vjy that which consists in 

 the systematic classification and arrangement of facts. The founda- 

 tion for all advancement to truth must be laid in the instances and 

 facts of experience ; man must begin by observing nature, then inter- 

 rogating her, subjecting her to a critical observing and experimental 

 investigation. He must then ascend from a clear and distinct know- 

 ledge of facts and particulars thus acquired to those general laws or 

 principles on which they depend. The order of procedure, never to 

 be reversed, is xipward from particulars to classes, thence upwai'd 

 still from class to higher class or wider class, as from circle to circle, 

 until the most general fact of all, which reveals to us the law, is 

 reached at the central point and summit of the ascending series. 

 The successive inductions are merely more genersjl facts rising out of 

 those more pai-ticular, until the process ends in the most general of 

 all, the law or essential principle sought. 



But clearly this method must fail of applicability in ti-eatment of 

 the now known facts of habit, facts which are incongruous and in- 

 coherent, which, occuring in the midst of apparently similar circum- 

 stances, nevertheless refuse to take classification together. This 

 method, as has been beautifully said, "cannot march and counter- 

 march upon the same plane in its route to results." One set of 

 instances points toward a general law, but the next says " right 

 about turn." We can find i;nder lying the known phenomena of 

 habit no general fact broad enough to embrace all specific varieties. 

 In some cases we find that repetition or persistency of an action or 

 impression gives increase of facility, or strength, or both ; but we 

 cannot thence infer a general law or construct a definition because, 

 in turning to the very next set of instances, we find that similar 

 repetition or continuance of action or impression gives dindnutioa 

 of strength or facility. No class of phenomena could be better 

 chosen than the phenomena of habit to illustrate the weakness of the 

 Baconian method. It collapses here in utter helplessness and unfit- 

 ness. It can find no common centre for facts so eccentric ; it cannot 

 bring together lines so little convergent that the point at which they 

 meet lies far beyond the utmost boundary of its vision. It might be 



