THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 153 



ACT I. 



SCENE :— CHARLEROI. 



Time :— 15th June, 1815. 



Nothing mai-ks more clearly the immense progress the world has 

 made since 1815, than the advance in the means of communicating 

 intelligence. To-day, if Russia masses her Cossacks at a point on 

 the Indian frontier, all England knows it the same day, and expla- 

 nations are demanded forthwith. 



In June, 1815, Napoleon threw 130,000 men on the Flemish 

 frontier, and neither Wellington nor Bliicher knew of it until the 

 blow struck them. Of his 200,000 men, Napoleon could at this 

 point only avail himself of 130,000. In Alsace, Savoy, the Py- 

 renees, and La Vendee were 52,800 more; the remainder of the 

 200,000 were in garrison at Pai'is, Lyons, and other places. It is 

 with the fortune of these 130,000 men that we have to deal. Napo- 

 leon, having decided to try the issue of war in Belgium, directed his 

 efforts towai'ds masking the movements of his troops. He had 

 divided his army into six corps, which, on the 1st June, were at 

 Valenciennes, Avesnes, Rocroi, Metz, and Laon. The Guard was at 

 Compiegne. The total strength of the army was 128,088 men, with 

 344 guns. All this mass was quietly moved in such a manner that 

 on the 14th of June the whole stood in front of Charleroi, ready to 

 strike, the emperor being personally in command. Opposed, were 

 the Anglo-allied and Prussian armies. 



The Duke of Wellington had at his disposal 105,000 men and 

 186 guns. 



Bliicher had about 120,000 men and 312 guns: in other words, 

 130,000 French and 344 guns, against 225,000 allies and 498 guns : 

 Napoleon against Bliicher and Wellington. The Anglo-allied and 

 Prussian armies lay side by side. The highway between Charleroi 

 and Brussels was the dividing line. It was the English left, the 

 Prussian right, except close to Charleroi, where the Prussians over- 

 lapped. From it Wellington's forces stretched to the sea. From it 

 Bliicher's extended to Liege, considerably over one hundred miles 

 from the sea. Wellington had named Enghien or Nivelles as his 

 point of concentration, as he might be attacked on his right or left 

 centre. Bliicher had chosen Sombref and Namur for the same pur- 

 pose. It will be seen that, while Wellington or Bliicher could each 

 concentrate his own troops on their own respective centre within a 



