THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 157 



the Brussels road at Quatre Bras. It was, therefore, of the greatest 

 consequence to Napoleon to take it, and to the allies to hold it. A 

 glance at the map will show that such was the case. If, then, Ney 

 had seized Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, Napoleon's tactics 

 would have been perfectly successful. His not doing so was the fii-st 

 failure in the campaign. Chai-ras says Ney was right in not attempt- 

 ing to attack Quatre Bras. The reasons he gives are cogent, but the 

 fact seems to be that Ney was imposed upon by the strong front 

 shown by Prince Bernhard, and could, if he had pressed on, have 

 carried Quatre Bras with ease. 



On the centre, owing to a mistake in the transmission of orders, 

 A^andamme's Division, instead of mai'ching at three in the morning, 

 did not march until seven o'clock. The Young Guard took their 

 place in the column. But the result of the delay was that the 

 advance guard of the centre, which appeared before Charleroi about 

 eight o'clock, was not supported until twelve. The Young Guard 

 then came up, and by their assistance Pajol, who led the advance, 

 entered Charleroi, passed through and pressed the Prussians, until 

 the latter stood firm at Fleurus. Grouchy, who subsequently came 

 up, halted with Napoleon's approval, and the latter returned to 

 Charleroi at eight o'clock, worn out with fatigue. The right, having 

 started later, reached Chatelet at three o'clock, and remained in front 

 of that place. Such were the results of the first day's operations. 

 The Sambre was crossed, Charlei'oi taken, the French centre and 

 right lay on the Namur road in front of Fleurus. Was the day suc- 

 cessful or not? The answer to this question depends on how far the 

 allies had made use of the time in concentrating their forces. We 

 have seen what Ziethen did. He concentrated his corps at Fleurus, 

 where he stood prepared to dispute the passage. 



We have seen that orders were given by Bliicher on the night of 

 the 14th to his army to close vip. 



By midnight on the 15th, Pirch I. had his whole corps (31,758 

 men) at Mazy, near Sombref, while Thielmann was a mile or two in 

 front of Namur. At ten o'clock at night of that day, Btilow was 

 still at Liege, far off". Thus Bliicher by midnight of the 15tli had 

 three corps, or nearly 80,000 men, within sixteen miles of the enemy. 

 What had Wellington done 1 We have seen that news of the French 

 advance was sent to him on the 12th. Sir Hussey Vivian, whose 

 Brigade of Cavalry was near Tournai, reported to him on that day that 

 2 



