158 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. 



the French were preparing to attack. He made no change in his 

 dispositions. On the 15th, at nine in the morning, he received a 

 dispatch from Ziethen, written from Charleroi, announcing that the 

 advanced posts on the Sambre were attacked. Still no movement 

 was made. The first order for concentration came from General 

 Constant de Rebecque, the Chief of Stafi' of the Prince of Orange, at 

 two o'clock in the afternoon. It was a partial order to the Second 

 Dutch-Belgian division, which was the extreme left of ^Yellington's 

 army, to concentrate at Nivelles and Qiiatre Bras. Information of 

 these orders was sent to Wellington at Brussels, but he still ordered 

 no general movement. Siborne says that the Prince of Orange, who 

 was in command of the First Anglo-Allied Corps, also forwarded to 

 Wellington a report which he had received from his outposts, stating 

 that the French had attacked the Prussian advanced posts on the 

 Sambre, and that this report reached Wellington at five o'clock p.m. 



Between eight and nine o'clock that evening came a letter from 

 Bliiclier, saying that Thuin had been attacked, and that Charleroi 

 appeared to be menaced. Then Wellington gave his first general 

 order for concentration. Siborne says this order was given about 

 five o'clock in the afternoon, but Charras has proved conclusively that 

 it was not sent iintil between eight o'clock and half-past nine in the 

 evening. 



There was, at the same time, a special order to the corps of the 

 Prince of Orange. It prescribed that the Perponcher Division, part 

 of which had been since noon disj^uting the Brussels road with the 

 French at Quatre Bras, a fact of which Wellington was unaware, 

 should go to Nivelles. At ten o'clock, further news had come in. 

 " After orders " were issued, with the view of completing the con- 

 centration. It was this news which broke up the Duchess of Rich- 

 mond's ball, so well known from Byron's lines. We cannot repeat the 

 orders, from want of space, but they can be seen in Siborne. If they 

 had been carried out, the Anglo-allied ai-my would have drawn away 

 from the Prussian. The extremity of the left wing would have been 

 five miles west of the Brussels road, and eleven miles from Sombref, 

 where the Prussians were collecting. 



At eleven o'clock at night, more precise intelligence came in, and 

 fresh and more urgent orders were sent out. But through all appears 

 the idea that the French would strike at Brussels, by way of Nivelles 

 or Braine-le-Comte, not by the Charleroi road. 



