160 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. 



but brought no reinfoi'cements : in fact, no more came up at all, 

 until three or half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. The Duke of 

 Wellington was on the ground at eleven o'clock, bvit brought no 

 troops. When Ney did attack, at two o'clock, he only attacked with 

 not quite 10,000 men of all arms. By three o'clock he had 17,615 

 in action, but during the whole of the rest of the day, he only had 

 22,000 men engaged, and of these only 15.750 were infantry, one of 

 his infantry divisions (Gerard's, 4,297 strong) having been withdrawn 

 from him by Napoleon. He made no use of D'Erlon's corps, 20,000 

 sti'ong. The delay on the left was most disa.strous to the French. 

 What was the situation elsewhei-e 1 



We have seen that at midnight of the 15th the only Prussian 

 corps in the immediate front of the French centre and right was 

 Ziethen's - 32,692 men, less the loss of the 15th, say 1,500 — say 

 31,000 men with 96 guns. The nearest coi'ps to Ziethen was that of 

 Pirch I., three divisions of which were at Mazy, nine miles from the 

 front. These three divisions arrived there from Namur, in obedience 

 to Bliicher's order of the evening of the 14th, at three in the after- 

 noon of the 15th, and halted at that place. They did not advance 

 to Sombref, face to face with the French, until about ten o'clock in 

 the morning of the 16th, when they were joined by their fourth 

 division, and that was the time when Ziethen received his first imme- 

 diate support. Up to that hour he had been alone in front of the 

 French, and subject to be attacked by Napoleon with the centre and 

 right of the French army, except such part as had not crossed the 

 Sambre. The result of such an attack could not be doubtful. The 

 next nearest corps to Pirch I. was that of Thielmann, but he was 

 close to Namur, twenty miles distant, during the whole night of the 

 15th, and only commenced to advance from Namur about seven 

 o'clock on the morning of the 16th. He arrived at Sombref about 

 twelve o'clock of that day. 



Three cannon-shots were heard from Fleurus at half-past two in 

 the afternoon. They were Napoleon's signal for attack. By that 

 time he had to deal with 90,000 Germans. Three-fourths of Bliicher's 

 army were concentrated and well posted for defence. 



Ney, as we have seen, had waited until two o'clock to commence 

 his attack on the left. What caused the delay 1 



The French army was anxious and ready to fight. Everything 

 depended on prompt action. Had such been the case, Ney with 



