THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 165 



case, and Charras disiDutes the fact ; but, on a fair examination of the 

 whole evidence, the conckision just stated is the most pi-obable. 



Instead of advancing to assist Napoleon, D'Erlon having been 

 summoned by Ney to return to him, countermarched his men and 

 arrived at Frasne too late to help Ney, as the battle of Quatre Bras 

 was over before he got there. Twenty thousand of Napoleon's best 

 troops marched and countermarched on this memorable day. Their ^ 

 absence from one field robbed the French of what undoubtedly 

 would have been a decisive victory. Their presence on the other 

 field would have turned an indecisive advantage into a complete 

 triumph. Ligny would have been a second Jena. It would have 

 been to the Prussians what Waterloo was two days afterwards to the 

 French. Na])oleon's calculations were correct. His left wing found 

 at first practically nothing to oppose them. His right wing and 

 centre were sufiicient to defeat the Prussians. He was not i-espon- 

 sible for the false movement which so fatally weakened both wings 

 without benefiting either. Had Ney swept the Brussels road clear 

 of the Anglo-allied array. Napoleon's anticipations of being in 

 Brussels that night would probably have been realized. That it was 

 not so was partially Ney's fault. It was not Napoleon's. 



ACT III. 



SCENE : — ON THE ROADS TO WATERLOO AND WAVRE. 



Time:— 17th June, 1815. 



The morning sun of the 17th June, 1815, rose on two ghastly 

 fields. At Quatre Bras over nine thousand combatants had been 

 either killed, wounded or missing, while at Ligny about twenty 

 thousand i-epresented the loss to both sides. Perhaps altogether 

 30,0UU men Jiors de combat. We have set forth the actual results of 

 the previous day. Ney had blocked Wellington, Napoleon had 

 defeated Bliicher. All had been over by ten o'clock. How had the 

 night been passed? To appreciate what took place it will be neces- 

 sary to consult the map. Bliicher, being forced to retii-e from Ligny, 

 had two courses open to him. He could retreat by way of Namur, 

 but that would separate him from Wellington, or he could retire to 

 Wavre, from which place it would be comparatively easy for him to 

 rejoin Wellington either before or behind Brussels. With desperate 

 tenacity he, or rather his Chief of Stafi", Gneisenau, chose the latter, 

 and the whole Prussian army, including Billow's corps, which came 



