THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 167 



by success, confident of complete triumph ; and on the next day but 

 one, at the same lioui-, behold these very troops, that mighty emperor, 

 flying in panic-struck confusion before their defeated foe, now 

 become a pursuing fury. Although we i-ecognize that the result was 

 probably better for the human race, we cannot help feeling that 

 species of gnawing regret which eats at the heart when it recurs to 

 what might have been, but is not. 



Napoleon, instead of sleeping on the field, went back to Fleurus 

 about eleven o'clock. It is genex-ally admitted that before he lay 

 down, he gave orders to Grouchy to send Pajol's light cavalry and 

 Teste's infantry after the retiring Prussians. Thiers says he also 

 sent order's to Ney to be under arms at daybreak, to press the Eng- 

 lish again. These latter orders are stated by no other author, but 

 are referred to in Soult's despatch of the next morning reiterating 

 them. Even admitting the genuineness of the other orders, those for 

 the pursuit of the Prussians appeal- to be utterly inadequate. With 

 every disposition to be chaiy of criticising such a man as Napoleon, 

 we must confess that the inadequacy of these orders is a mystery to 

 us, for which we can find no satisfactory solution. Napoleon must 

 have miscalculated the efiect of the battle. Perhaps he undervalued 

 Bliicher. Some authors attribute his lethargy to his enfeebled bodily 

 condition — it seems to us very wrongly, on a fair consideration of all 

 Napoleon did achieve. But whatever the reason, the fact is there 

 that tlie Prussians were allowed the whole night and the next morn- 

 ing to retire on "VVavi-e, and no suilicient attempt was made to follow 

 up their traces. 



Napoleon was perfectly justified in turning his whole strength 

 immediately against the English. His plan was to throw his centre 

 where it was needed, and he was quite right to transfer it at once 

 from his right to his left. But why he did not ascertain more ex- 

 actly what his right had to do, is very difiicult to explain. He 

 seemed to have thought that the Prussians would retire towards their 

 own base, namely, Namur, not towards Brussels by way of Wavre, 

 as tliey did. His first oi-ders were to follow them towards Namui*, 

 and there appears to be little doubt but that, in this instance, he was 

 mistaken in the inference he drew from his success. The person to 

 whom is due the credit of the masterly Prussian retreat, which un- 

 questionably saved the campaign, is Gneisenau, whose name is com- 



