168 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. 



paratively unknown. Napoleon's mistake, for it seems to us that it 

 can be called by no other name, undoubtedly contributed to Waterloo, 

 The events of the day were as follows : Napoleon rose at five, 

 and sent ofi" orders for Lobau's Corps to march towards the 

 left, followed by the Guard, and then the heavy cavalry. About 

 six o'clock, General Flahault returned from Ney, and reported 

 the result of Quatre Bras. Napoleon immediately sent a written 

 order through Soult to Ney, explaining the position of afFaii'S, 

 and urging him to advance. Charras says this order was not sent 

 off until eight o'clock ; Thiers says about seven o'clock. Napo- 

 leon left Fleurus for the front about eight o'clock. Other orders 

 were sent out at the same time for a review of the troops who had 

 fought at Ligny. This review began about nine o'clock, and lasted 

 till nearly noon. Meantime Lobau, the Guard, and the heavy cav- 

 alry were moving to the left, and rejjorts from the reconnaissances 

 were coming in. It seems to have been Napoleon's plan that Ney 

 should advance, on the theory that the English could not oppose 

 him, in view of the fact that the Prussians were in retx'eat. Ney 

 could not advance, because Wellington was in front of him with 

 about forty thousand men. They were not withdrawn until about 

 one o'clock. By noon, Napoleon sent out an order by Soult to Ney 

 to advance, and followed it immediately himself. This fact, which is 

 important, is fixed by the despatch from Soult to Ney, wliich bears 

 the date d midi. Before he started Napoleon gave his famous orders 

 to Grouchy. The latter must, then, have i-eceived them between 

 twelve and one. These orders were verbal. Thiers gives a version 

 of them which contradicts that of Grouchy. The historian appeals 

 to Marshal Gerard, and other witnesses, and they appear to us ex- 

 actly the orders which Napoleon would have given. The fons el 

 origo mali was undoubtedly the impression which the staff had, if 

 Napoleon himself did not share it, that the Prussians were in retreat 

 upon Namur ; and from this time to the end of the campaign we see 

 Grouchy wasting his strength hunting for Bliicher exactly where he 

 was not, and entirely ignorant as to what line he ought to take. For 

 the present we leave him, and follow Napoleon. The latter was 

 delayed in the advance by the resolute front shown by the English 

 cavalry, who were protecting Wellington's retreat. He retreated as 

 soon as he ascertained Bliicher's disaster, but only to make a better 

 stand. The English horsemen gave the French a taste of what they 



