172 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE. 



Communications passed between Wellington and Bliicher on the 

 ITth, in which the lattei* promised that he would assist Wellington, 

 not only with two army coi'ps, but with his whole army. He added 

 that if Napoleon did not attack on the 18th, they would attack him 

 on the 1 9th. Such was the spirit in which the men of that day fought 

 for their homes. In pursuance of this promise he started his four 

 corps early on the 18th. Billow's was the leading division. Its 

 advance reached St. Lambert (see map) about noon, but its main 

 body not until three o'clock. Ziethen's Corps had to cross the line of 

 Bulow's march, and, owing to the delay thus caused, did not reach 

 Chain (see map) until six o'clock. Pirch had to leave half his corps 

 for the defence of Wavre against Grouchy, and joined Billow with 

 the other half about half-past seven in the evening. Thielmann was 

 held at Wavre by Grouchy. 



Thus, at half-past eleven, Bulow's was the only Prussian column 

 near Wellington, and he was at St. Lambert, five miles from the 

 fiwhting. From that time to half-past four, this corps was straggling 

 throuo-h horrible roads in the valley of the Lasne, in order to seize a 

 position on the French right. At that hour they entered into the 

 operations of the field of Waterloo. 



The reader will now understand (if he consults the map) what 

 influence Grouchy could have had by advancing towards Planchenoit, 

 instead of on to Wavre. It is, perhaps, only curious speculation, 

 but it is worth following out, as the turning incident in the campaign. 

 There is not much doubt upon one point, at all events : Grouchy 

 could have considerably delayed, if he could not have prevented 

 altogether, Bliicher's junction with Wellington on the 18th. Grant- 

 ino- that he was where he was in obedience to his orders ; granting 

 that Napoleon was as much responsible as he was for the waste of 

 strength, and useless cavalry marches on the wrong flank ; granting 

 all this, giving him every credit for every possible effbi't hitherto ; now, 

 at all events, he should have seen the mistake. There was the firing, 

 there were the Prussians plainly se^^n on the road towards it, — the 

 very privates saw what was to be done, but the general was blind. 



It is useless to fight the Battle of Waterloo over again. Thanks 

 to the old stubborn valour of the British soldiery, and to the tenacity of 

 the British commander-in-chief, who knew his men, and did not 

 spare them, the British held their own. They had all they could do 

 to manage it. It is easy to appreciate the influence which the 



